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Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC: Where
Discovery Issues Meet Current Immigration Policy
Brooke Rogers*
In 2016, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether a district court’s finding that
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowed discovery of U-visa
information from individual plaintiffs. The court declined to impose an order
of its own. Instead, it remanded the case to the district court to devise an
approach to U-visa discovery that “adequately protects the diverse and
competing interests at stake.”1
The Fifth Circuit case arose when workers at a Koch Foods plant brought
a Title VII suit against Koch. They alleged Koch supervisors made it common
practice to grope female workers, assault them, and often offer female
workers money or promotions for sex. Koch defended, arguing that workers
fabricated their accusations in hopes of securing U-visas, an incentive that
those who assist the government in investigating qualifying crimes may
receive under the Violence Against Women Act. And, Koch argued that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission solicited and certified these
false claims to build a high-profile, class-based discrimination suit against
the company. The case highlights by far the most contentious issue regarding
U-visas under the current administration, and conservative administrations
in recent years: that mass “fraud” has destroyed United States immigration
procedures.
Rather than remanding the case, the Fifth Circuit should have imposed a
total bar on the discoverability of this information because the idea that
“mass” fraud in the U-visa system is exaggerated, and the importance of
upholding the legislative intent behind the program outweighs the relevance
of such information.
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INTRODUCTION
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U), an alien2 who has suffered
2. The statue uses the word “alien,” and, to mirror the statute, this Note uses the term “alien” to
describe those who are applying for U-visas. Although the term alien has a negative connotation,
that is not my intention. It should also be noted that U-visas under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) are
used more to protect aliens, not nonimmigrants. Nonimmigrants have some sort of legal status
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“substantial” physical or mental abuse as the result of being a victim of a
crime may file an application granting the applicant a temporary visa,
designated as a U-visa. If the alien meets the statute’s requirements, the
applicant will be eligible for employment authorization. Then, after three
years of U-visa status and continuous physical presence in the United
States, the applicant may apply for lawful permanent residency. 3 When
Congress passed this statute, it did so knowing that aliens were
understandably reluctant to come forward to law enforcement agencies
when they are the victims of crimes for fear of deportation.4 Congress
explicitly stated that alien women and children were often targeted
victims of sexual assault and domestic violence and needed further
protections than what was originally given in the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA).5 From that understanding, Congress
stated the purpose of the Act and the U-visa program was to “encourage
law enforcement officials to better serve immigrant crime victims and to
prosecute crimes committed against aliens.”6
A concern that arises from all visa applicants, including the U-visa, is

through travel visas or work visas; therefore, they are more likely to come forward because they
are less likely to be subject to deportation. However, as stated in an amicus curiae brief filed on
behalf of the plaintiffs in Cazorla, VAWA’s confidentiality protections help both documented and
undocumented immigrant crime victims. Brief of Amici Curiae LatinoJustice PRLDEF et al. in
Support of Appellant EEOC Seeking Reversal of Decision Allowing Discovery of Confidential
Information Disclosed in U Visa Applications at 53, Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838
F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-60562), 2015 WL 6506235 [hereinafter Brief of LatinoJustice
PRLDEF]. “If the victim leaves or loses their employment or does not continue with school or work
as a result of the crime victimization, the victim can become undocumented. . . . Using discovery
in civil cases as a means by which perpetrators and employers can directly force victims to reveal
information that they were assured would remain confidential will only enhance their
apprehension.” Id.
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(l)(1)(A) (2012).
4. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §
1502, 114 Stat 1464, 1518 (2000) (citing two major goals: “Congress finds that—(1) the goal of
the immigration protections for battered immigrants included in the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994 was to remove immigration laws as a barrier that kept battered immigrant women and
children locked in abusive relationships; (2) providing battered immigrant women and children who
were experiencing domestic violence at home with protection against deportation allows them to
obtain protection orders against their abusers and frees them to cooperate with law enforcement
and prosecutors in criminal cases brought against their abusers and the abusers of their children
without fearing that the abuser will retaliate by withdrawing or threatening withdrawal of access to
an immigration benefit under the abuser’s control.” (citation omitted)).
5. See id. (citing a third major goal of the U-visa program: “[T]here are several groups of
battered immigrant women and children who do not have access to the immigration protections of
the [VAWA] which means that their abusers are virtually immune from prosecution because their
victims can be deported as a result of action by their abusers and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service cannot offer them protection no matter how compelling their case under existing law.”).
6. Id.
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an issue of fraud.7 U-visa opponents allege that aliens file fraudulent
accusations against so-called aggressors to obtain U-visas, and therefore
stay in the United States under false pretenses.8 Many members of
Congress have found fault with the prior administration’s handling of the
U-visa program and have called on the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to revamp the program, stating, “fraud and abuse of the program
can lead to unjustified approvals leaving legitimate victims in the
shadows.”9 Just how fraudulent the program really is remains a source of
debate.10 The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) is only allowed to approve 10,000 U-visas every year, making

7. Those seeking visas for asylum purposes are just one example of how fraud plagues the
immigration system. In a recent discussion held by the Center for Immigration Studies with thenacting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Thomas Homan, Homan stated
the following regarding asylum fraud:
[A] vast majority of these families [from Central America] don’t show up in immigration
court and they get an order in absentia, because they—not only did they enter the country
illegally and go into hiding, they won’t appear in front of an immigration judge. . . .
. . . [L]ook at the facts of what’s going on, look at how many—how many families
do not get a final fear finding from a judge—because most don't; like 80 percent of them
do not. . . .
....
So there’s a lot of fraud going on. And they know it, and they’re certainly not going
to show up to a judge and, you know, present a fraudulent case. And 80 percent don’t
get a fear finding. . . . I think a majority of them are taking advantage of a low threshold,
and there’s a lot of asylum fraud going on, and they're hiding. . . .
....
They figured out the loopholes. They figured that, as I just said, they can come and
have due process at great taxpayer expense and just disappear into society.
Jessica M. Vaughan & Tom Homan, Immigration Newsmaker: A Conversation with ICE Deputy
Director
Tom
Homan,
CTR.
FOR
IMMIGR.
STUD.
(June
6,
2018),
https://cis.org/Transcript/Immigration-Newsmaker-Conversation-ICE-Deputy-Director-TomHoman.
8. See Malia Zimmerman, Immigrants Preying on Americans with False Tales of Abuse to Stay
in US, Experts Say, FOX NEWS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.foxnews.com/us/immigrants-preyingon-americans-with-false-tales-of-abuse-to-stay-in-us-experts-say (claiming the rise in U-visa
applications is not because there has been a wave of domestic violence toward immigrants, but
because there is fraud in the system); Alex Pappas, Immigration Attorney Pleads Guilty to Filing
More Than 250 False Visa Applications, FOX NEWS (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/immigration-attorney-pleads-guilty-to-filing-more-than-250false-visa-applications (reporting on an Indiana attorney who filed numerous false visa
applications).
9. Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and
Representative Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, to Department of
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson (Dec. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Grassley Letter], available
at
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-goodlatte-probe-u-visaimmigration-parole-practices-following-fraud.
10. See infra Part IV (discussing whether the fraud allegations are truly as bad as is sometimes
reported).
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it one of the most limited visa programs administered by the DHS.11
Opponents of the program now have the Trump administration’s support,
and it has come to light in recent months that many aliens are in threat of
being deported despite having pending U-visa applications with
USCIS.12 Immigration policies have radically changed, and will continue
to do so, as the administration attempts to follow through on its policies.13
With it, this “fraud” argument has permeated through Capitol Hill and
Twitter along with other charged rhetoric about immigration and aliens.14
11. Congress has statutorily capped the number of U-visas available at 10,000 per fiscal year. 8
U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2)(A) (2012). USCIS issued all 10,000 U-visas in 2017. USCIS Grants All
Available U Visas for Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-grants-all-available-u-visas-fiscal-year-2017. However,
other visas, such as those for specialty occupations, DOD cooperative research and development
project workers, and fashion models, are capped as high as 65,000 per fiscal year. H-1B Specialty
Occupations, DOD Cooperative Research and Development Project Workers, and Fashion
Models, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/workingunited-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-dod-cooperative-research-anddevelopment-project-workers-and-fashion-models.
12. See John Bowden, ICE Stepping Up Deportation of Crime Victims Requesting Visas:
Report, THE HILL (July 19, 2018, 9:53 AM), https://thehill.com/latino/397841-ice-stepping-updeportation-of-crime-victims-awaiting-visa-report (reporting that ICE has apparently changed its
policy under the Trump administration to permit the deportation of aliens who have applied for a
U-visa); Alexandra Villarreal, US Deporting Crime Victims While They Wait for U Visa, CHI. SUN
TIMES (July 20, 2018, 7:23 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/immigration/us-deporting-crimevictims-u-visa-bernardo-reyes-rodriguez-donald-trump/ (noting immigration attorneys are baffled
by ICE’s abrupt change of policy as their clients are deported despite the ongoing U-visa
application process).
13. President Trump has made many changes to US immigration policy during the first two
years of his presidency. Changes included ending the protection for over 200,000 Salvadorans who
have been in the United States since at least 2001. Rafael Bernal, Trump Officials End Immigration
Protection for 260k Salvadorans, THE HILL (Jan. 1, 2018, 10:12 AM),
http://thehill.com/latino/367892-report-trump-to-end-immigration-protection-for-200000salvadorans. Temporary Protected Status (TPS) was awarded to Salvadoran civil war refugees who
were in the United States legally or illegally. Id. For a more comprehensive report on potential
immigration reforms under the current administration, see DAVID WEISSBRODT, LAURA
DANIELSON & HOWARD S. MYERS III, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL III–
VIII (7th ed. 2017) (discussing the potential impact of various immigration reforms under
consideration by the Trump administration). President Trump’s numerous attempts at banning
immigrants from certain Middle Eastern countries had been blocked at the federal courts numerous
times, but the Supreme Court approved a narrowed version of the ban. See Timeline of the Muslim
Ban, ACLU https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2423 (2018).
14. Students at UCLA conducted a study that looked at more than 6000 tweets and 300 speeches
by Trump during both his campaign and presidency. Ronn Blitzer, University Study Analyzes 6,000
Trump Tweets Which ‘Prove’ Racial Bias in Immigration Stance, LAW & CRIME (Dec. 29, 2017,
11:45 AM), https://lawandcrime.com/immigration/university-study-analyzes-6000-trump-tweetswhich-prove-racial-bias-in-immigration-stance/. In summary, their report concludes that Trump’s
rhetoric is as follows: “America, the once great castle on the hill, is besieged. Its walls are broken,
its border lays open, and it is overrun by ruthless invaders. . . .” UCLA César E. Chávez Dep’t of
Chicana
&
Chicano
Studies,
Our
Findings,
UCLA
(Dec.
21,
2017),
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The importance of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cazorla v. Koch
Foods of Mississippi, L.L.C. is nuanced.15 Cazorla implicates the
connection between discovery issues and U-visas in a way that could be
easily overlooked. There is virtually no precedent concerning whether Uvisas are discoverable, as discovery issues are often resolved in the lower
courts.16 And the issue involves both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and statutory provisions. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, a
judge can restrict discovery “for good cause . . . to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense.”17 Under 8 C.F.R. § 214.14, the regulation which implements
the U-visa program, “[a]gencies receiving information under this
section . . . are bound by the confidentiality provisions and other
restrictions set out in 8 U.S.C. 1367.”18 The combination of 8 C.F.R. §
214.14 and 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2), the statute which prohibits the “use by
or disclosure to anyone . . . of any information which relates to an alien
who is the beneficiary of an application for relief under paragraph . . .
(15)(U),”19 yields Cazorla. The Fifth Circuit in Cazorla attempted to
clarify what is discoverable from individual plaintiffs and certifying
agencies like the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
when it comes to U-visa discovery,20 based on virtually no precedent.21
Relying on the statutes, and trying to take into account the public policy
reasons for U-visa confidentiality, the Fifth Circuit ultimately reversed

https://www.thepresidentsintent.com/our-findings/.
15. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016).
16. There are, however, a number of circuit court cases arising from discovery disputes that
afford district courts wide discretion in discovery matters. See, e.g., Bradley v. King, 556 F.3d
1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that “[a] district court has wide discretion in discovery matters
and our review is ‘accordingly deferential’” (quoting Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271,
1280 (11th Cir. 1998))); Gov’t of Ghana v. ProEnergy Servs., LLC, 677 F.3d 340, 344 (8th Cir.
2012) (stating that “[a]ppellate review of a district court’s discovery rulings is ‘both narrow and
deferential’” (alteration in original) (quoting Roberts v. Shawnee Mission Ford, Inc., 352 F.3d 358,
360 (8th Cir. 2003))).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
18. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(e)(2) (2018).
19. In full, 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2) states that no government agency may
permit use by or disclosure to anyone (other than a sworn officer or employee of the
Department, or bureau or agency thereof, for legitimate Department, bureau, or agency
purposes) of any information which relates to an alien who is the beneficiary of an
application for relief under paragraph (15)(T), (15)(U), or (51) of section 101(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(T), (U), (51)] or section
240A(b)(2) of such Act [8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2)].
8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2) (2012).
20. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 547.
21. Id. at 555 (noting that “this dispute presents an issue of first impression in our circuit”).
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and remanded the lower court order.22
This Note analyzes and critiques the decision reached by the Fifth
Circuit in Cazorla, as well as its impact on the future of the U-visa
program. The Fifth Circuit tried, but ultimately failed, to account for the
important public policy implications of allowing the discovery of U-visa
information from the individual plaintiffs. An absolute bar on discovery
of this information should have been awarded, and it was well within the
court’s power to do so. It is the victims of such abuse, beyond just the
workplace abuse found in Cazorla, who will ultimately suffer as well as
the public at large.
Part I of this Note discusses the legislative history and intent of the Uvisa program,23 the intersection between the U-visa and discovery,24 the
sparse relevant case law leading up to the Cazorla decision,25 and the
district court’s opinion.26 Part II discusses Cazorla,27 details the dispute
over the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1367,28 and parses the Fifth Circuit’s
Rule 26 balancing test.29 Part III analyzes some of the missed arguments
the Fifth Circuit did not rely on, compares those arguments to the ones it
did rely on, and discusses possible rationales behind those decisions.30
Part IV details the implications that the Fifth Circuit’s opinion will have
on the future of the U-visa program and its beneficiaries.31
I. TRANSITION OF U-VISA INTENT FROM A LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVE TO
THE COURTROOM AND THE BEGINNING OF CAZORLA
The intersection between Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and U-visas has come up in a small number of district courts,
therefore it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court has never addressed
the issue.32 Discovery issues are case specific, and making bright-line
rules for whether there should be complete bars is typically best left to
22. Id. at 564.
23. See infra Part I.A (introducing the legislative history and intent of the U-visa program).
24. See infra Part I.B (detailing the intersection between U-visa and discovery issues).
25. See infra Part I.C (discussing the relevant case law).
26. See infra Part I.D (discussing the district court’s opinion).
27. See infra Part II.A (introducing Cazorla).
28. See infra Part II.B (detailing the dispute over the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1367).
29. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s Rule 26 balancing test).
30. See infra Part III (analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s opinion).
31. See infra Part IV (discussing the impact of the Fifth Circuit on the U-visa program).
32. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 559 (5th Cir. 2016) (explaining “the
considerable deference” the court gives to lower courts in discovery rulings, which would explain
why these issues rarely make it to the Supreme Court); see also McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct.
1159 (2017) (reviewing the enforcement of subpoenas issued by the EEOC under an abuse of
discretion standard, resolving a circuit split where the Ninth Circuit traditionally used de novo
review).
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district and circuit courts.33 The circuits are split as to the degree to which
U-visas obtained through VAWA and other types of documentation
information should be discoverable, especially in cases involving sexual
assault, harassment, and domestic violence.34 Leading up to Cazorla,
through a myriad of reported and unreported cases, other courts also
struggled with how much information is too much, bearing in mind the
important public policy and legislative intent issues. The following
section will unpack the legislative intent of U-visas, the intersection
between U-visas and the workplace, the relevant case law leading to the
Cazorla litigation, and the district court’s opinion.
A. Legislative History and Intent of U-visas
U-visas were first introduced in 2000 as part of the reauthorization of
VAWA and a specific addition of the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act (VTVPA).35 VAWA was introduced in 1994,
and when it was up for reauthorization in 2000, Congress created new
avenues of relief for immigrant victims of human trafficking and other
crimes by creating T-visas36 and U-visas.37 As testified on the Senate
floor in 1999:
Of course, a comprehensive effort to reduce violence against women
and lessen its damages must do more than just arrest, convict and
imprison abusers—we must also help the victims of violence. This
legislation proposes to assist these crime victims in three fundamental
ways:
Immediate protections from their abuser—such as battered women’s
shelters; help so that they can have access to the courts and legal
assistance necessary to keep their abuser away from them; and
33. See supra note 16 (citing cases expressing deferential review of district court decisions
regarding discovery disputes).
34. See infra note 251 (discussing the circuit split in more detail).
35. The law was officially passed in 2000 with bipartisan support. VTVPA also introduced
T-visas, which are used for victims of trafficking. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text
(discussing Congress’s stated goals and reasons for creating the U-visa program).
36. Although both passed under the same law, a T-visa is slightly different from a U-visa.
T-visas focus on applicants who are victims of trafficking, and do not require certification. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(U), (T) (2012). For a more in depth explanation of the differences between U- and
T-visas, see Leslye E. Orloff, Kathryn C. Isom & Edmundo Saballos, Mandatory U-visa
Certification Unnecessarily Undermines the Purpose of the Violence Against Women Act’s
Immigration Protections and Its “Any Credible Evidence” Rules—A Call for Consistency, 11 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 619, 643–44 (2010).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U), (T). Congress also created the VAWA Self-Petition for
Permanent Residence, which allows for an abused spouse to no longer require the sponsorship of a
US citizen or a lawful permanent resident spouse, but instead can “self-petition,” enabling the
victim to leave the abusive marriage and still become a permanent resident. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(a)(1)(A), (B).
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removing the “catch-22s” that may literally often force women to stay
with their abuser—such as the discriminatory insurance policies which
could force a mother to choose: turn-in the man who is beating me or
keeping health insurance for her children.
....
. . . In 1994, we worked out provisions so battered immigrant
women—whose ability to stay in the country was dependent on their
husbands—would not have to [choose]: stay in America and continue
to get beaten or leave their husbands, end the abuse, but have to leave
America (perhaps even without their children).
While we had fixed some aspects of this problem in 1994, there
remain other aspects of immigration law which leave a woman with just
such a horrible, unfair and immoral choice. . . . [W]e have worked to
include in this legislation several of these corrections.38

The purposes of U-visas are laid out in the statute:
(1) to remove barriers to criminal prosecutions of persons who commit
acts of battery or extreme cruelty against immigrant women and
children; and (2) to offer protection against domestic violence occurring
in family and intimate relationships that are covered in State and tribal
protection orders, domestic violence, and family law statutes.39

Alien victims of crimes are less likely to come forward due to fears of
deportation, and Congress determined this remedy would alleviate such
fears.40 Four requirements must be met to be eligible for a U-visa: (1) the
alien must have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse from having
been a victim of a qualifying criminal activity;41 (2) the alien must have
38. 144 CONG. REC. 10,143 (1998) (statement of Senator Biden). For more pertinent quotes
from the floor debate surrounding the passage of VAWA, see Katrina Castillo et al., Legislative
History of VAWA (94, 00, 05), T and U-Visas, Battered Spouse Waiver, and VAWA Confidentiality,
NAT’L IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOC. PROJECT (June 17, 2015), http://library.niwap.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/VAWA_Leg-History_Final-6-17-15-SJI.pdf.
39. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§ 1502(b)(1)–(2), 114 Stat 1464, 1518 (2000). See also notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
40. A detective in Payson, Arizona testified regarding the necessity of U-visas:
[F]or victims of sexual assault or child crimes. . . . [t]he initial call is a real problem for
law enforcement. If people are not making the call to law enforcement, which happens
when people don’t know the U-visa is available, this is a problem. This is the hard part
because people are reluctant to call since they are worried about deportation. I don’t
know if there are any plans to get the word out for people who need it.
Report: The Importance of the U-visa as A Crime-Fighting Tool for Law Enforcement
Officials—Views from Around the Country, NAT’L IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOC. PROJECT 3
(Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter NIWAP U-visa Report], http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/IMM-Qref-UVisaCrimeFightingTool-12.03.12.pdf. This is just one of many
testimonies that show how the U-visa program makes it more likely aliens will come forward.
41. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., U VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION RESOURCE GUIDE 4
[hereinafter DHS GUIDE], https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_u_visa_certification_
guide.pdf. The following constitute qualifying crimes within the meaning of the VTVPA:
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information concerning that criminal activity; (3) the alien must have
been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful in the investigation
or prosecution of the crime as certified by an appropriate agency;42 and
(4) the criminal activity violated US laws.43
There was a seven-year period between the creation of the U-visa
program and when USCIS published the U-visa interim final rule.44
When the interim final rule was published, it imposed many new
procedures for those seeking U-visas.45 While certifying agencies
followed certain informal rules before the process was fully regulated,
the standardization of the certification process brought significant
changes for applicants. Now, the applicant must not only fill out a Form
I-918, applicants must also provide a Form I-918, Supplement B,
(Supplement Form B), filled out by a law enforcement officer, for the
agency to certify their petition.46 Supplement Form B requires law
enforcement officials to describe the criminal activity involved, any
injuries to the victim, the type of help that the victim is providing to law
enforcement, and any involvement of the victim’s family members.47
Both Form I-918 and Supplement Form B also require that, for many
questions to which an applicant answers “Yes,” they must also provide
abduction, abusive sexual contact, blackmail, domestic violence, extortion, false imprisonment,
fraud in foreign labor contracting, genital female mutilation, felonious assault, hostage, incest,
involuntary servitude, kidnapping, manslaughter, murder, obstruction of justice, peonage, perjury,
prostitution, rape, sexual assault, sexual exploitation, slave trade, stalking, torture, trafficking,
witness tampering, unlawful criminal restraint, and other related crimes. Id. at 3. The list is
intentionally broad and nonexhaustive to give law enforcement flexibility. For more information
on how law enforcement can “narrow” down to a qualifying crime, see GAIL PENDLETON,
LEXISNEXIS, WINNING U VISAS: GETTING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION 5–6 (2008),
http://www.asistahelp.org/documents/resources/ExpCommPendleton0208_B744054E28C97.pdf
(noting that “the crimes listed are just general categories” and explaining strategies to ensure the
crime listed in an application is a qualifying crime).
42. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2), (b)(3) (2018). See also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM I-918 at 12 (2017),
http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-918instr.pdf (detailing evidence that will be considered
“helpful”).
43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012) (detailing the statutory requirements a victim must
meet to obtain a U-visa).
44. See infra note 54 (discussing the issues caused by the seven-year delay in more detail); see
also Micaela Schuneman, Note, Seven Years of Bad Luck: How the Government’s Delay in Issuing
U-Visa Regulations Further Victimized Immigrant Crime Victims, 12 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST.
465, 466 (2009) (describing the ramifications of the interim rule).
45. See New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for “U” Nonimmigrant
Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014 (Sept. 17, 2007) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (2018)).
46. Id. at 53,023 (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(i)).
47. See id. (stating that the certifying agency must fill out Form I-918, Supplement B); U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FORM I-918, SUPPLEMENT
B, U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS CERTIFICATION (2017) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT FORM B],
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-918supb.pdf.
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additional information in that form.48 If the victim meets the statutory
requirements and the appropriate certifying agency approves the
application, the applicant can remain in the United States for up to four
years and will receive authorization to work.49 As is common with many
immigration policies, the program is plagued with certification issues,
delays in issuance and certification, and complaints of fraud.50
U-visa certification is a major hurdle for many to overcome due to the
vast discretion that certifying bodies and individuals possess, and
typically no applications for a U-visa will be accepted without a
certification.51 With the multiple requirements and hurdles that an
applicant must go through, the U-visa process is possibly one of the
slowest pathways to citizenship, taking almost fifteen years to
complete.52 This is due not only to the delays in certification, but also the
48. SUPPLEMENT FORM B, supra note 47; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGRATION SERVS., FORM I-918, PETITION FOR U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS (2017)
[hereinafter FORM I-918], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-918.pdf. For
example, Form I-918 asks whether petitioner has ever “[s]erved in any prison, jail, prison camp,
detention facility, labor camp, or any other situation that involved detaining persons.” FORM I-918,
supra. If that petitioner had checked yes, they are asked to describe the circumstances under “Part
8. Additional Information.” Id.
49. U-visas are typically valid for four years. See Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant
Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victimshuman-trafficking-other-crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victimscriminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status (last updated June 12, 2018) (detailing the general
application process). However, under limited circumstances, extensions past the four years are
available. See Policy Memorandum on Extension of Status for T and U Nonimmigrants 8–9 (Apr.
19, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2011/April/exten.
status-tandu-nonimmigrants.pdf (addressing the specific circumstances where extensions may be
given).
50. By way of illustration, in 2015, Representative Diane Black introduced the U-visa Reform
Act. In a press release by the congresswoman, she stated that “the program has become a backdoor
for obtaining permanent legal status . . . . Rampant fraud and abuse of U Visas now undermines its
effectiveness for law enforcement and circumvents the law abiding individuals who seek to
immigrate to our country through the proper channels.” Press Release, Representative Diane Black,
Black Introduces U Visa Reform Act (Feb. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Black Press Release],
https://votesmart.org/public-statement/764305/black-introduces-u-visa-reformact#.XFXIrc9Ki8o. Fraud complaints will be discussed in depth in regard to discovery issues later
in this Note.
51. See generally DHS GUIDE, supra note 41 (detailing the many factors and circumstances
considered with regard to law enforcement certification of an alien’s U-visa application). For more
background, see UNC SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRATION/HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY CLINIC, THE
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE U VISA: ELIGIBILITY AS A MATTER OF LOCALE 9–10 (2014),
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/uvisa/fullreport.pdf (noting that “[s]ince the
advent of the U visa, immigrant and civil rights advocates have observed that there is no uniformity
in the [Supplement Form B] certification process” and detailing the harms this causes to U-visa
applicants); see also Tahja L. Jensen, Comment, U Visa “Certification”: Overcoming the Local
Hurdle in Response to A Federal Statute, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 691, 704 (2009) (discussing the
possibility that anti-immigration viewpoints are “fueling the lack of certifications”).
52. Imogene Mankin, Abuse-in(g) the System: How Accusations of U Visa Fraud and Brady
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high volume of U-visa applications.53 Each problem comes with its own
unique proposals, but the issue of discovery of U-visa applications has a
direct impact on litigation.54
B. The Intersection Between U-visas and the Workplace
In 2007, DHS and USCIS named the EEOC a “certifying agency”
permitted to provide certification for U-visa petitions.55 As such, the
EEOC is one of many government agencies with the power to certify that
an alien victim’s petition meets the statutory requirements of supporting
the investigation or prosecution of one or many of the qualifying
crimes.56
In a July 2008 memorandum, the EEOC wrote its own policies and
procedures on how to best determine if a petition should be awarded
certification.57 First, the regional attorney (RA) and staff will assess the
petition for certification and conduct an initial inquiry into whether the
alien meets certain requirements, including an in-person interview of the

Disclosures Perpetrate Further Violence Against Undocumented Victims of Domestic Abuse, 27
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 40, 48 (2017).
53. See id. (explaining the multiple waiting periods an applicant faces when seeking a U-visa,
often due to application backlog). See also, e.g., Catholic Charities CYO v. Chertoff, No. C 071307 PJH, 2007 WL 2344995, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007) (summarizing the class action
complaint filed by Catholic Charites and other legal aid organizations alleging that USCIS delays
in promulgating the necessary regulations to certify and issue U-visas greatly harmed one’s chances
of getting a U-visa). Even after USCIS issued rules governing certifications, general delays in
receiving U-visas based on arbitrary reasons still plague the system.
54. As one commentator pointed out, “there is still much uncharted territory in the
implementation of the statute and regulations, and the adjudication of the visa petitions . . . due in
large part to the government’s seven-year delay in issuing implementing regulations.” Elizabeth M.
McCormick, Rethinking Indirect Victim Eligibility for U Non-Immigrant Visas to Better Protect
Immigrant Families and Communities, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 587, 590 (2011). See
SUPPLEMENT FORM B, supra note 47.
55. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2018).
56. Id.; DHS GUIDE, supra note 41, at 3. Other labor enforcement agencies with certifying
power include the US Department of Labor, the National Labor Relations Board, the California
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, the California Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement, the Illinois Department of Labor, and the New York Department of Labor. The
UVisa: A Potential Immigration Remedy for Immigrant Workers Facing Labor Abuse, NAT’L
EMP’T L. PROJECT 3–4 (Mar. 2014) [hereinafter NELP U-Visa Remedy],
http://nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/UVisa.pdf.
57. Memorandum from EEOC Chair Naomi C. Earp to District Directors and Regional
Attorneys on EEOC Procedures for U Nonimmigrant Classification Certification (July 3, 2008)
[hereinafter
EEOC
Procedures],
http://www.asistahelp.org/documents/resources/EEOC_
procedures_for_U_visa_certific_A9ABDA9CC5582.pdf. The above-referenced EEOC document
contains a three-page memorandum from EEOC Chair Earp introducing the attached “EEOC
Procedures” to the EEOC district directors, which contains the actual policies and procedures the
EEOC adopted regarding U-visa certification. All subsequent references to this document will be
to the EEOC Procedures and not the accompanying memorandum.
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candidate.58 The qualifying criminal activity the RA finds “must be
related to the unlawful employment discrimination alleged in the charge
or otherwise properly under investigation by the EEOC.”59 If the RA
believes that the petition has merit, the RA will submit it to the general
counsel who will conduct a similar analysis before submitting it to the
office of the c
air (OCH).60 The OCH will ultimately determine if the EEOC is the
appropriate certifying agency for that petition.61 The information the
OCH requires to certify U-visa petitions is rife with details that employers
attempting to defend against certain workplace violation charges may
find helpful in mounting their defense.
To start, the OCH requires an explanation of how the case came to the
attention of the EEOC officer, the credibility of the charging party based
on an in-person interview, a draft Supplement Form B, and any additional
supporting documentation that may be necessary, including relevant case
law and legal authority.62 There are multiple parts in Supplement Form
B where the EEOC’s implementation memorandum specifically asks for
as much information as possible. By way of example: “Subpart 5 asks the
certifying agency briefly to describe the criminal activity being
investigated and/or prosecuted and the involvement of the victim seeking
U nonimmigrant status in that activity. As much factual detail as possible
should be provided.”63 Subpart 6 asks for a description of any known or
documented injury to the victim. Again, as much information as possible
is needed to determine if the victim suffered substantial physical or
mental abuse as required by the statute.64 Information requested by
Subpart 6 requires explicit details regarding workplace sexual
harassment, assault, or rape. Because the EEOC is asking for “as much
information as possible,”65 and victims are asked to supplement any parts
with their own explanations,66 it is unsurprising that many defendants
58. Id. at 1.
59. Id. Because the EEOC handles employment disputes, it will only certify petitions that arise
from such disputes. As will be discussed later, there is a significant problem with workplace sexual
harassment and assault toward alien workers. See NELP U-Visa Remedy, supra note 56, at 2–3
(detailing the types of worker abuse that qualify as “criminal activity” for purposes of U-visa
certification, which include felonious assault, abusive sexual contact, rape, sexual assault, and
sexual exploitation).
60. EEOC Procedures, supra note 57, at 12.
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see SUPPLEMENT FORM B, supra note 47 (stating that applicants are allowed to
supplement the Supplement Form B with any information).
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seek this information during various types of litigation.67
C. Relevant Case Law Leading up to the Cazorla Litigation
Because disputes involving U-visas—as well as other types of visas
provided by VAWA—are under-litigated,68 there are few decisions on
the issue of exactly how much U-visa information should be
discoverable. The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit to directly address this
issue, as many of these discovery requests are dealt with by the lower
courts. In such cases, some courts resolve this issue by reading the plain
language of Rule 26 in conjunction with the requested information,
including the district court that first heard Cazorla.69
In Camayo v. John Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., the US District Court
for the District of Colorado ruled on a motion to compel the production
of documents and responses to interrogatories that would require
plaintiffs to disclose certain aspects of their immigration status, such as
whether they had applied for a U-visa or T-visa.70 The defendant
67. While this Note focuses on companies seeking U-visa information to defend against EEOC
charges or other workplace-related litigation, discovery of U-visa information is also an issue in
criminal matters. Criminal defendants also try to use this information to combat criminal charges.
For example, in Hawke v. United States Department of Homeland Security, No. C-07-03456 RMW,
2008 WL 4460241 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008), a battered wife applied for a U-visa months before
her husband was arrested for misdemeanor battery against her. Id. at *1. The husband requested the
wife’s U-visa information because it would contain her sworn testimony regarding the extent of his
abuse that he could possibly use to impeach her. Id. The court held that the restrictive language
under VAWA and 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2) (2012) barred the husband from access to that information.
Id. at *7. In another case, a criminal defendant, facing charges of unlawful sexual contact and gross
sexual assault, sought discovery of the alien victim’s, as well as the victim’s mother’s, immigration
status. State v. Marroquin-Aldana, 89 A.3d 519, 524 (Me. 2014). The Maine Supreme Court ruled
that the trial court’s decision to quash the subpoena was not an abuse of discretion because the
subpoena did not state with specificity the information the defendant sought; rather, this was no
more than a “fishing expedition,” which ran contrary to the protections given to documents filed
with immigration authorities pursuant to federal law. Id. at 530.
68. See McCormick, supra note 54, at 590 (noting “there is still much uncharted territory in
the . . . adjudication of the visa petitions” largely due to the seven-year delay in implementing
regulations).
69. See generally Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10cv135-DPJ-FKB, 2014 WL
12639863 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014).
70. Camayo v. John Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., Nos. 10-cv-00772-REB-MJW, 11-cv-01132REB-MJW, 2012 WL 5931716, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 27, 2012). This case involved requesting
direct information from the plaintiffs themselves—the plaintiffs did not file any actions with the
EEOC or other federal employment bodies. Id. However, it is noted in Camayo’s complaint that
the US Department of Labor had previously filed a suit against John Peroulis & Sons in 2000,
which resulted in the parties entering into an “H-2A Compliance Plan” where the defendants
agreed, among other things, to:
(1) prohibit acts of workplace violence; (2) provide workers with adequate breaks for
eating meals; (3) require that workers have a two-week supply of food at all times; (4)
provide workers access to a telephone to make phone calls; (5) provide workers copies
of the work contract and employee handbook; and (6) ensure that workers are in
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company, John Peroulis & Sons, had employed the plaintiffs, Roel Espejo
Camayo and Juvencio Samaniego Damian, as H-2A71 visa workers.72
Upon arrival at the ranch where plaintiffs would be working, their
passports and H-2A visas were immediately confiscated, they were
forced to work long hours with little food, and they were verbally and
physically abused, all in violation of the defendants’ H-2A compliance
plan.73 Both plaintiffs were independently threatened with deportation to
Peru on multiple occasions for “seemingly any reason.”74 Plaintiffs
brought suit to recover damages for injuries inflicted by the defendants
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
(TVPRA),75 the Colorado Wage Claim Act,76 and a number of common
law claims including assault, battery, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.77
In the resulting litigation, the defendants served interrogatories on both
plaintiffs asking them to “[d]escribe in detail your efforts to obtain a Tor U-visa,” including a detailed description of “when you first learned
about the possibility of obtaining T- or U-visas and from whom,” their
“efforts to secure visas for any family members, and whether such visas
have been issued and to whom,” and “all statements, written or oral, made
by you or others on your behalf as part of the application process.”78 The
defendants also requested that plaintiffs produce “all documents related
in any way to your efforts to obtain a T- or U-visa,” including the actual
application.79
The district court granted the motion to compel by turning to the plain
language of Rule 26(b)(1) that states the scope of discovery includes
information “relevant to any party’s claim or defense” and information
possession of their passports and visas at all times.
See Complaint ¶¶ 61–64, Camayo v. John Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., Nos. 10-cv-00772REB-MJW, 11-cv-01132-REB-MJW, 2012 WL 5931716 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014), 2010
WL 2315400.
71. See 8 U.S.C. § 1188. Visas offered under this statute allow employers to hire foreign
workers to come to the US to perform temporary agricultural work.
72. Complaint, supra note 70, ¶¶ 6–7.
73. Id. ¶¶ 45–64.
74. Id. ¶ 58. The threat of deportation or being forced out of the US is high even when the
worker is in the US legally on a nonimmigrant visa. See Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, supra
note 2, at 54 (noting that “[e]ven immigrant women who become naturalized U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents have residual fears of adverse immigration actions”).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 et seq. (2012).
76. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-101 et seq. (2018).
77. Complaint, supra note 70, ¶¶ 113–84.
78. Camayo v. John Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., Nos. 10-cv-00772-REB-MJW, 11-cv-01132REB-MJW, 2012 WL 5931716, at *1–2 (D. Colo. Nov. 27, 2012).
79. Id. at *2.
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that is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”80 The court reasoned that because the defendants were
purporting the plaintiffs fabricated the extent of their harm in order to
obtain U- or T-visas and leave their employment, this information was
paramount to the case, making disclosure necessary.81 The court further
found that the in terrorem effect82 of disclosure would be adequately
addressed by an order restricting the use of the information outside the
current dispute.83
Another case that sheds some light on this issue is David v. Signal
International, LLC, a 2010 district court case from Louisiana84 that the
Fifth Circuit relied on heavily in Cazorla.85 In David, the defendants were
facing a class action suit brought on behalf of over 500 Indian men who
alleged Signal enticed them to travel to the United States under the H-2B
guest worker program in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which
promised that “qualified candidates” could obtain legal permanent
residence.86 Upon arrival, the plaintiffs were subjected to extremely poor
working conditions.87 When workers complained, Signal threatened
them with deportation and refused to supply them with the visas
originally promised.88 Signal sought discovery from the plaintiffs of any
80. Id. at *1. Note that due to a 2015 amendment, Rule 26 no longer employs the language that
information be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” See FED.
R. CIV. P. 26. However, both the district court and circuit court in Cazorla ruled before the 2015
amendments.
81. Camayo, 2012 WL 5931716, at *2.
82. The in terrorem effect test weighs whether disclosure would threaten or intimidate present
or future parties from litigation on similar issues. For clarity, and unless otherwise necessary, I will
describe the Rule 26 balancing test as the need for the information weighed against the public policy
implications of disclosure, instead of the in terrorem effect. This is in an effort to discuss
implications beyond what can be indicated by the Federal Rules. For an interesting discussion and
background on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and disclosure, see generally Charles W.
Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)—“Much Ado About
Nothing?”, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (1995) (examining the disclosure rule in the context of the recent
debate over discovery abuse and the general outcry for corrective response to what are seen by
many as runaway litigation costs).
83. Camayo, 2012 WL 5931716, at *2. The plaintiffs opposed the defendant’s motion to
compel, citing the “chilling effect” that disclosure would entail. Id.
84. David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 735 F. Supp. 2d 440 (E.D. La. 2010).
85. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 556 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing David as
the most analogous case). Although David deals with T-visas, the T-visa and U-visa programs are
similar in the type of information disclosed. See supra notes 35–37 (discussing the passage of
VTVPA in 2000, which included both the T- and U-visa programs).
86. David, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 441.
87. Id. at 443. David Kurian, the class representative whose factual assertions the court deemed
representative of the other plaintiffs, claimed that the living conditions and food at Signal were
horrible, that the guards searched the workers whenever they left, and that they were forced to do
all of the unsanitary work while none of the American workers were required to do such work. Id.
88. Id.; see also supra note 74 (discussing the persistent threat of deportation migrant workers
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applications for T- and/or U-visas and any supplemental visas they may
have tried to procure for family members.89 The plaintiffs objected,
arguing such information was confidential, and Signal responded that the
discovery was legitimate because the confidentiality bar under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1367 only applies to federal information, and no agency was currently
involved in the dispute.90 Signal also argued that any right to
confidentiality found under the statute was waived because an “unrelated
putative class member” had turned a T-visa application over to a local
newspaper.91 Thereby, the argument goes, they waived their individual
confidentiality privilege—so all class members had effectively waived
their privilege.92
After much back and forth, the court upheld its previous order that
effectively barred the defendants from any inquiry into the plaintiffs’
current immigration status, as it was deemed irrelevant to the claims
asserted and “discovery of such information would have an intimidating
effect on an employee’s willingness to assert his workplace rights.”93
Additionally, the court flat-out rejected Signal’s claim that the class
members had waived any privilege to their T- and U-visa information
based on the fact that one class member shared information with a
newspaper.94 The court rejected this premise not only because there is no
case law to support it, but also because no class yet existed.95 Ultimately,
the parties agreed that the class representatives would produce the sworn
statements attached to the T- or U-visa applications, which the court
found as “the most productive way to resolve the instant dispute.”96
These two cases give a good overview of some of the issues that the Fifth
face, even when they are in the country legally).
89. David, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
90. See id. at 444 (stating that “no agency has asserted the Section 1367 privilege”).
91. Id. at 447 (stating that “Signal contends that it is engaged in a two-front war, one in this
forum and one in the press”). In its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel, Signal cited an
online media outlet that “published an account explicitly based on T visa applications about former
Signal H2B workers who were arrested in North Dakota” as the reason the privilege was waived.
Memorandum of Defendant, Signal International, LLC in Support of Motion to Compel at 6, David
v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 735 F. Supp. 2d 440 (E.D. La. 2010) (No. 08-cv-01220), 2010 WL 3017670.
It also demanded that because the article was so unfavorable toward Signal, Signal should have had
access to the information out of fairness. Id. at 7. See also Editorial, They Pushed Back, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/opinion/29tue3.html (discussing the facts of
the David case and cheering the USCIS’s decision to grant special visas to about 150 of the
approximately 500 plaintiffs in David, having concluded they were subject to involuntary servitude
and were entitled to visas as victims of human trafficking).
92. David, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 444.
93. Id. at 447 (citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 448.
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Circuit would later face in Cazorla.
D. District Court Battle
The US District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, when it
heard Cazorla, cited to little guiding authority because little precedent
existed.97 The district court had to rule on the relevant discovery issues
involving not only the EEOC claim, but also the eleven individual
plaintiffs who filed separately from the EEOC. The EEOC got involved
in 2009, when ten workers filed Title VII discrimination claims with the
EEOC alleging abuse by Jessie Ickom, Juan Garcia, and other employees
at a Koch Foods processing plant.98 In 2010, several of the same workers
then filed suit in the district court against Koch and Ickom, a case that
would remain pending while the EEOC investigation took place.99 The
EEOC investigated the charges against Koch, found reasonable cause to
believe that Title VII violations had occurred, and attempted
conciliation.100 Attempts at conciliation failed, and in June of 2011 the
EEOC filed its own suit against the company with an estimated class of
fifty to seventy-five other Hispanic men and women.101 The district court
consolidated the EEOC’s and the individual claimants’ suits.102
97. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10cv135-DPJ-FKB, 2014 WL 12639863, at
*3 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014) (noting “[a]s an initial point, there is little guidance” because
“[s]ection 1367 has rarely been examined in this context, and § 214.14(e)(2) has never been cited
in a reported opinion”). As a result, the district court cited less than half a dozen cases in its opinion
that pertain to the relevance of the information versus the effect of its disclosure. Id. at *5–6. But
this is not uncommon when comparing this district court case to the cases discussed in Part II.C.
See supra notes 68–96 and accompanying text (detailing two factually relevant cases, Camayo and
David, that deal with the same issue but reach different, unpersuasive conclusions).
98. The EEOC’s second amended complaint claimed that between 2004 and 2008, Jessie Ickom
and Juan Garcia supervised the deboning area where most of the alleged abuse took place. Second
Amended Complaint ¶ 19, EEOC v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:11-CV-00391-CWR-LRA,
2012 WL 12033809, (Sept. 17, 2012). Note that the EEOC’s complaint was originally filed in
EEOC v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, which was later consolidated with Cazorla. Agreed
Order of Consolidation and Allowing Intervention, Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10CV-135-DPJ-FKB, 2014 WL 12639863 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014), 2011 WL 13079215.
99. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 98, at 2.
100. There were three Title VII charges against Koch detailed in the Second Amended
Complaint filed by the EEOC. Count I was that the company engaged in unlawful employment
practices by creating a hostile work environment based on sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII); Count II was that Koch created a hostile work environment based
on national origin/race in violation of Title VII; and Count III was for retaliation in violation of
Title VII. Id. ¶¶ 46, 57, 69.
101. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 545–46 (5th Cir. 2016); see also
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 7 (stating “[t]he Commission made a good faith
effort to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion, which efforts proved unsuccessful,” and listing the Commission’s
various efforts such as inviting Koch Foods to meet with the EEOC, which did not work).
102. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 546. See also Agreed Order of Consolidation and Allowing
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The alleged events took place at Koch Foods’s large poultry processing
plant in Morton, Mississippi.103 The plant employees were
overwhelmingly Hispanic, illiterate, spoke little English, and many were
undocumented.104 The harassment and hostile conduct allegedly
occurred on a weekly or daily basis from 2004 to 2008.105 The EEOC
complaint outlined the allegations of abuse toward employees working
under Ickom and Garcia.106 The EEOC recounted that on more than one
occasion, Ickom removed female employees from the production line to
an isolated area and attempted to sexually assault them.107 Ickom, Garcia,
and other supervisors also offered money to employees in exchange for
sex and made unwanted physical advances toward female employees
such as touching and openly groping them in plain view of the plant’s
security cameras.108 Supervisors including Ickom and Garcia verbally
and physically harassed the male employees, and made them pay money
to use the bathroom, maintain their job positions, or use sick time.109
When employees tried to complain about this conduct, they, their family
members, or their spouses who also worked at the plant “were subjected
Intervention, supra note 98.
103. According to Koch Foods’s website, the corporation began in 1985 when it was “a
one-room chicken deboning and cutting operation with only 13 employees.” It is now one of the
leading poultry processors in the country, and in 2015 it reinvested $100 million to expand its
capacity in Ohio and Mississippi. About Us: Our Story, KOCH FOODS,
http://www.kochfoodsinc.com/our-company/about-us (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). The Morton plant
was one of the plants upgraded in 2015, representing $33 million of the corporate investment while
creating 180 jobs. Koch Foods Expanding in Forest and Morton, Mississippi, Creating 203 New
Jobs, MISS. DEV. AUTHORITY, https://www.mississippi.org/general/koch-foods-expanding-inforest-and-morton-miss-creating-203-new-jobs/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
104. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 544. This is not uncommon in the United States. According to a report
published by the NIWAP, of the 250,000 laborers employed in the 174 US chicken factories, at
least half are Latino and more than half are women. Alina Husain & Leslye E. Orloff, Immigrant
Women, Work, and Violence Statistics, NAT’L IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOC. PROJECT (June 19,
2015),
http://library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/CULT-RCH-ImmigrantWomenWork
Violence_FactSheet.pdf.
105. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 22.
106. Id. ¶¶ 24–45.
107. Id. ¶ 24. The risk for abuse is incredibly high for alien workers, but women are among the
most vulnerable. See Husain & Orloff, supra note 104 (discussing how immigrant workers are
particularly susceptible to abuse).
108. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶ 24, 27.
109. Id. ¶ 25. While immigrant women are considered the most vulnerable because of the
particularly odious sexual violence they face, immigrant men are subjected to incredible, albeit
different, abuse. See generally Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The
Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345 (2001),
reprinted in 22 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 303 (2001) (discussing the extreme working
conditions undocumented workers face in the United States and how immigration law oftentimes
undermines labor protections intended to protect undocumented workers, and advocating for
reform).
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to escalated and more frequent physical or sexual assaults.”110 By the
time the EEOC filed the second amended complaint, two and a half years
later, more than 117 employees were listed as aggrieved individuals.111
There were many issues to be litigated in this case, but the issue of
U-visa discovery went first through a magistrate judge, then a district
court judge, before reaching the Fifth Circuit.112 Koch had already made
a broad request for immigration status information from the EEOC and
the individual claimants, but the court granted the EEOC and individual
plaintiffs a Rule 26 protective order.113 Koch then made a more limited
request for information relating to the individual plaintiffs’ attempts to
obtain T- or U-visas.114 In support, Koch argued that it was entitled to the
information because the allegations, “particularly claims of sexual and
physical assaults and extortion, are false and were made solely for the
purpose of obtaining such benefits.”115 The plaintiffs opposed Koch’s
motion, arguing that Koch’s theory, that the plaintiffs falsely claimed to
be victims of abuse as a means to obtain temporary legal status, was
“mere conjecture and speculation.”116 Ultimately, Magistrate Judge Ball
ruled that because Koch had raised a “legitimate defense” it was entitled
to pursue discovery to the ends of that defense.117 The judge’s reasoning
was as follows:
The relevance of this information clearly outweighs its in terrorum [sic]
effect, as any individuals who have applied for immigration benefits
have, necessarily, already disclosed their immigration status to federal
110. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 35.
111. Id. ¶ 89. Koch argued on appeal that the jump in the number of “aggrieved individuals”
named by the EEOC was proof of mass fraud in the system, but the Fifth Circuit rejected this
argument. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 558 (5th Cir. 2016).
112. In August 2012, Koch Foods served the EEOC and the individual plaintiffs with discovery
requests for U-visa and other immigration status information. The plaintiffs moved for a Rule 26
protective order, and in response, Koch Foods did not allege that the plaintiffs were lying to get the
visas. Therefore, Koch Foods’s first attempt to obtain the plaintiffs’ immigration status information
was denied. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10cv135-DPJ-FKB, 2014 WL 281979, at
*1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 24, 2014), modified on reconsideration, 2014 WL 12639863 (Sept. 22, 2014);
see also Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 546.
113. Cazorla, 2014 WL 281979, at *1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *2. Judge Ball cited two cases to support this decision. The first is Camayo v. John
Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., No. 10-cv-00772-MSK-MJW, 2012 WL 5931716 (D. Colo. Nov. 27,
2012), which has been discussed at length above. See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text.
The second case is EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. CV-11-3045-EFS, 2013 WL 3940674, at
*7 (E.D. Wash. July 31, 2013), a similar case to Camayo and Cazorla, where the district court held
that discovery into the plaintiffs’ T-visas was allowed since it pertained to the defendants’ defense,
specifically that the plaintiffs’ allegations of abuse were not credible and were only made to secure
legal status.
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authorities. Koch Foods’s motion is granted as to its discovery requests
concerning these matters, subject to the entry of an appropriate
protective order.118

Therefore, while Judge Ball did deny Koch’s motion to reconsider the
November 2012 discovery that broadly requested immigration status
information, he nonetheless ordered the plaintiffs and the EEOC to “serve
full and complete answers to interrogatories” to various questions about
their attempts to obtain T- or U- visas, which the EEOC had potentially
issued as a certifying body, and produce all documents pertaining to such
answers.119
Plaintiffs immediately filed a motion for reconsideration,120 which was
denied, and then sought review of the magistrate judge’s order by the
district court judge, pursuant to Rule 72, providing that a district judge
“must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to.”121 In September of 2014, the
magistrate judge’s order was reviewed to determine if the order was
“clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.”122 The plaintiffs raised three
issues that the district court would take under consideration: “(1) whether
Koch Foods is estopped from pursuing this discovery; (2) whether the
Magistrate Judge’s order contravenes the U-Visa-authorizing statute and
U-Visa regulations; and (3) whether the in terrorem effect of the
discovery outweighs the information’s relevance.”123 Under Rule
26(c)(1), the district court was tasked with balancing the defendants’
interest in obtaining access to the U-visa information against the EEOC
118. Cazorla, 2014 WL 281979, at *2.
119. Id.
120. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10cv135-DPJ-KFB, 2014 WL 12639863, at
*1 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014). The interim procedural history was detailed in the district court
opinion:
The Magistrate Judge granted Koch Foods’s motions in part, finding that the
relevance of the alleged motivation clearly outweighs the alleged in
terrorem effect of allowing production. This prompted Plaintiffs to file a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied, and subsequent objections
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. On May 23, 2014, the Court took
Plaintiffs’ objections under advisement and ordered them to produce certain
information for in camera review. After an Emergency Motion to Clarify,
Plaintiffs complied, and the matter is now ripe for decision.
Id. (citations omitted).
121. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72 (permitting a party to file objections to a magistrate judge’s order
and requiring the district court to “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous
or is contrary to law”).
122. Id.; Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *1. A district court may only modify orders if, after
reviewing the entirety of the evidence, the court “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
123. Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *2.
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and individual plaintiffs’ interests in keeping the information
confidential, while recognizing the broad discretion given to the
magistrate judge to award such protective orders.124
The district court immediately rejected the plaintiffs’ quasi-estoppel
argument.125 In regard to the plaintiffs’ argument that the magistrate
judge’s order contravened the underlying statute and regulations, the
district court explicitly pointed out there was “little guidance on these
provisions.”126 Applying the plain meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1367 and 8
C.F.R. § 214.14(e)(2), the district court found the applicable law did not
bar the production of U-visa information directly from the individual
claimants who were parties to the civil suit.127 The district court reasoned
that if Congress had “wished to create an absolute privilege, it could have
easily drafted that language. It did not, and the court affirm[ed] the
Magistrate Judge on this issue with respect to the Individual
Plaintiffs.”128 Regarding disclosure by the EEOC, the district court
overruled the magistrate judge’s ruling, instead holding that Koch could
not circumvent the law by obtaining the same information it originally
sought to discover from the individual claimants through the EEOC.129
In the individual plaintiffs’ last argument to bar Koch from discovering
U-visa information, they asked the district court to restrict discovery of
this information because any relevance it had was “clearly outweigh[ed
by] the in terrorem effect of its disclosure.”130 Again, the district court
124. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). The balancing test under Rule 26(c)(1) applies to all
discovery disputes, and it was used in both Camayo and David. See supra notes 70–83 and 84–96
and accompanying text (discussing the application of the balancing test in Camayo and David,
respectively).
125. Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *2. Quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting a
right that is ultimately inconsistent with a position that is it has already taken. Here, the district
court found little support for this argument and found that Koch’s request for U-visa information
was in line with its defense that the plaintiffs falsified their claims. Id.
126. Id. at *3. Because district courts have so much discretion over the scope of discovery under
the Federal Rules, there are few cases on point. See infra note 142 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s
adherence to allowing broad district court discretion).
127. Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *3 (noting that the law “prevent[s] the EEOC from
unilaterally disclosing the information, [but] it does not prohibit discovery directly from an
applicant who is a party in the civil context”).
128. Id. The court cited an unreported Connecticut district court case for support. See Demaj v.
Sakaj, No. 3:09 CV 255(JGM), 2012 WL 476168, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2012) (holding that
while “arguably running afoul of the letter of this section,” production of U-visa information from
the individual plaintiffs is not barred, but discovery from the DHS is barred (citation omitted)).
129. Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *3–4. The statute is quite unambiguous: Section
1367(a)(2) precludes covered entities, like the EEOC, from disclosing “any information which
relates to an alien who is the beneficiary of an application for relief.” Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012).
130. Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *4. The individual plaintiffs and the EEOC cited cases
previously discussed in this Note, primarily Global Horizons, Inc., Camayo, and David. Id. at *4–5.
See supra note 117 (discussing Global Horizons, Inc.); supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text
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noted the lack of binding and analogous precedent governing these
issues.131 The district court noted “most of the cases Plaintiffs cite fail to
address discovery related to U visas whereby an alien and his or her
family members can gain the privilege of remaining in the United States”
temporarily and that “[t]he cases that do mention T and U visas are
nonbinding and not persuasive.”132 The district court further concluded
that, because the truthfulness of the claims was the salient issue, Koch
raised a legitimate defense and would be allowed discovery as to the
efforts the claimants took to procure immigration benefits that arose out
of the allegations in the lawsuit.133 The district court acknowledged the
plaintiffs’ alternative arguments—arguments that will be discussed more
in the Fifth Circuit opinion—but stated the court could alleviate any fears
of retribution and criminal prosecution, should the information be
discovered, by redacting and limiting the dissemination of such
information.134 The district court recognized that Koch’s discovery
requests in their current form sought information beyond the scope of the
magistrate judge’s order, and instructed the plaintiffs to limit their
answers to the relevant interrogatories “to immigration efforts related to
the allegations in this case.”135 The district court applied the same limit
to the document requests.136 As such, the plaintiffs were ordered to
produce relevant Supplement Form B’s and any additional submissions
or related communications, but any information outside the scope of the
litigation was ordered to be redacted.137
II. CAZORLA V. KOCH FOODS OF MISSISSIPPI, L.L.C.
A. Introduction
After the district court entered the order, the plaintiffs—both the
EEOC and the individual claimants—and Koch Foods appealed.138 The
EEOC sought an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and to
stay proceedings, which both the district court and Fifth Circuit
(discussing Camayo); supra notes 84–96 and accompanying text (discussing David).
131. Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *4.
132. Id. See also supra note 97 (detailing the lack of precedent and courts’ mixed holdings as a
result thereof).
133. Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *5–6.
134. Id. at *6.
135. Id. at *7.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. The district court certified the EEOC’s order for interlocutory appeal and stayed the
proceedings; the Fifth Circuit granted both the petition and cross-petition. Cazorla v. Koch Foods
of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir. 2016).
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certified.139 Broadly, the EEOC and individual plaintiffs argued that the
district court erred in not giving enough weight to their in terrorem
arguments for blocking Koch’s discovery, and Koch argued that the
district court erred in blocking any discovery from the EEOC.140 The
Fifth Circuit addressed many issues, but the two most legally significant
were as follows: (1) whether Section 1367 completely bars U-visa
discovery from both the individual claimants and the EEOC;141 and (2)
whether the district court abused its discretion when, in conducting its
Rule 26 balancing analysis, it found the probative value of the visa
information to Koch outweighed the hardship to the plaintiffs.142
Before addressing the two main issues, the Fifth Circuit discussed
Koch’s jurisdictional claims and the appropriate legal standard and
procedure for a Rule 26 discovery dispute.143 Koch asked the Fifth
Circuit to exercise its discretion not to review the district court’s Rule 26
balancing on interlocutory review and to dismiss the individual plaintiffs
because they did not file a timely motion to intervene.144 While it may
seem arbitrary to bring up these arguments in one breath and swiftly
dismiss them in the next, in addressing the jurisdictional issues the Fifth
Circuit acknowledged, “[B]y fully addressing [these issues], we may be
able to hasten the end of this already long-running litigation, e.g., by
preventing post-trial appeals on the same topic and clarifying the
permissible scope of U visa discovery, preventing further pretrial
disputes.”145 For that reason, despite the fact that “Rule 26 balancing
139. See id. at 546–47 (summarizing the procedural history of the case). Koch opposed the
EEOC’s motion for an interlocutory appeal at the district court level. See Koch Foods of
Mississippi, LLC’s Response to Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B), Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10-CV-135-DPJFKB, 2015 WL 3970606 (S.D. Miss. June 30, 2015), ECF No. 504.
140. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 548.
141. Id. at 551–54.
142. Id. at 555–64. The Fifth Circuit cited the following factors to consider when evaluating
abuse of discretion:
when a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered;
when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant weight; and
when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing
those factors, commits a clear error of judgement.
Id. at 547 (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984)). The abuse of
discretion standard is on par with other discovery cases the Fifth Circuit has heard. See Kelly v.
Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 855 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[a] district court
has ‘broad discretion in all discovery matters,’ and ‘such discretion will not be disturbed ordinarily
unless there are unusual circumstances showing a clear abuse’” (quoting Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d
276, 283 (5th Cir. 1982))).
143. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 547–50.
144. Id. at 547–49.
145. Id. at 548. At the time the Fifth Circuit considered the case, the litigation was six years old
and still in the discovery stage. The individual plaintiffs filed their complaint in March 2010 and
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disputes do not normally merit interlocutory review,” the Fifth Circuit
saw an opportunity to put this litigation to rest by “review[ing] the district
court’s discovery order in its entirety,”146 and denied Koch’s request that
the court stay its hand.147
The Fifth Circuit also dismissed Koch’s argument that the individual
plaintiffs did not file a timely petition for permission to intervene.148
Because Rule 5149 allows petitions for discretionary review, like Section
1293 interlocutory review, to be filed within the time specified by the
statute, and Section 1293 does not specify such timing, the timing of
petition for appeal is designated by Rule 4(a).150 Under Rule 4(a)’s
“timeline for intervention in an appeal as of right,” the plaintiffs were
within the appropriate deadline by filing twelve days after the EEOC did
for interlocutory review.151 Having dispensed with the procedural
arguments, the Fifth Circuit moved to address the substantive issues.
The standard for discovery disputes is an important part of the Fifth
Circuit’s decision. The district court applied Rule 26(c)(1), allowing for
restrictions on certain discoverable information “for good cause . . . to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense.”152 At the district court level, it was the
plaintiffs who had the burden to show good cause for barring the
information, “which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration
of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.”153
their case was consolidated with the EEOC’s case in December 2011. See Cazorla v. Koch Foods
of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10-CV-135-DPJ-FKB, 2011 WL 13079215 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 5, 2011).
146. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 548. The Ninth Circuit has also exercised its discretion under Section
1292 to review a district court’s Rule 26 balancing analysis on interlocutory appeal. See Rivera v.
NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (exercising review under Section 1292 of
the district court’s discovery order, concluding that it was “neither erroneous nor contrary to law
for the district court to protect the plaintiffs, and the public interest, from being unduly burdened
by issuing the protective order”).
147. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 547–49. The district court ultimately “certified the order for
interlocutory review because it found that its interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1367 was a ‘controlling
question of law.’” Id. at 548 n.16. But as the district court explained, an “appellate court may
address any issue fairly included within [a] certified order because ‘it is the order that is appealable,
and not the controlling question identified by the district court.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996)).
148. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 548–49. The district court only certified the EEOC’s motion for
interlocutory appeal; therefore, the individual plaintiffs had to seek permission from the Fifth
Circuit to intervene in the appeal. See supra note 139 (discussing the procedural history following
the district court’s entry of the discovery order).
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.
150. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 549.
151. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a).
152. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10cv135-DPJ-KFB, 2014 WL 12639863, at
*2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)).
153. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 549 (quoting the district court’s order and finding the plaintiffs failed
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On appeal, the plaintiffs disputed the assignment of the burden, and
instead urged that “U-visa information is . . . presumptively sensitive
information,” thus the burden should be on the party that requests the
information to show a particularized need.154 However compelling the
argument, the Fifth Circuit refused to consider it because it was not
presented to the district court first.155 Thus, the plaintiffs “more elaborate
theory” was waived and would not be considered on appeal.156
B. Dispute Over Interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1367
The Fifth Circuit then set its sights on the first main issue: whether the
plaintiffs waived their Section 1367 claims, whether Section 1367 applies
to the EEOC, and whether Section 1367 protects individual U-visa
disclosure.157
The Fifth Circuit first rejected Koch’s contention that the plaintiffs
waived their Section 1367 claims by not explicitly stating the responses
fell under Section 1367 protection.158 In fact, the court reasoned that
many of the plaintiffs’ discovery responses did explicitly cite Section
1367 protections, and the plaintiffs expressly claimed that the information
in dispute was exempt from discovery under the magistrate judge’s
to carry their burden by arguing Section 1367’s confidentiality provisions protected the individual
claimants and that the in terrorem effect of U-visa discovery would outweigh its relevance).
154. Id. (alteration in original). In their appellate brief, the individual plaintiffs (also referred to
as the “intervenors”) argued that U-visa discovery is similar to tax return discovery. Brief for
Intervenors Agustin Barragan-Davalos et al. at 13–14, Cazorla, 838 F.3d 540 (No. 15-60562), 2015
WL 6663697. Tax returns often contain information that is within the ordinary scope of discovery,
but courts routinely disallow it because “[n]ot only are the taxpayer’s privacy concerns at stake, but
unanticipated disclosure also threatens the effective administration of our federal tax laws.” Id. at
13 (alteration in original) (quoting Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2
F.3d 1397, 1411 (5th Cir. 1993)). The individual plaintiffs also analogized U-visa information to
presentence investigation reports, or PSIRs, where courts generally look at three considerations
before allowing this information to be disclosed during discovery: (1) “the privacy interest of the
defendant;” (2) “the government’s interest in access to information needed in criminal
investigations; and” (3) “the sentencing court’s interest in insuring that relevant information to the
sentencing decision is available to the court.” Id. at 14–15 (citing United States v. Huckaby, 43
F.3d 135, 137–38 (5th Cir. 1995)). The individual plaintiffs argued that under that framework the
burden should be Koch’s because U-visa information is explicitly recognized as a class of
“presumptively sensitive information.” Id. at 17.
155. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 549–50.
156. Id. at 550. In what appears to be a bit of wrist slapping, the Fifth Circuit noted,
In their appeal briefing, plaintiffs reference several points in the record where they
purportedly pressed their argument, but each shows, at most, that plaintiffs occasionally
used the term “need” and advocated a balancing approach in contesting whether Koch
was entitled to the discovery it sought. This did not suffice to preserve the more elaborate
theory they advance on appeal.
Id.
157. Id. at 550–55.
158. Id. at 550–51.
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original 2012 protective order.159 Therefore, the waiver claim was
rejected.160
Next, the Fifth Circuit addressed Section 1367’s application to the
EEOC. As discussed above,161 under the “straightforward” reading of 8
U.S.C § 1367 and C.F.R. § 214.14, “[a]gencies receiving information
under this section . . . are bound by the confidentiality provisions and
other restrictions set out in 8 U.S.C. 1367.”162 To that end, agencies, like
the EEOC,163 may not disclose that information to anyone as it relates to
the U-visa applicant.164 The Fifth Circuit was unpersuaded by Koch’s
argument that Section 1367 does not preclude discovery of U-visa
information because the statute does not explicitly “prohibit discovery of
U-visa information in litigation.”165 The court acknowledged Koch was
correct that Congress typically explicitly states when it is creating an
“evidentiary privilege,”166 but found the DC Circuit’s decision, In re
England, more persuasive than Koch’s argument.167 The Fifth Circuit
adopted the same reasoning the DC Circuit used for barring the disclosure
of certain military promotion records by stating that Koch was barred
from disclosure of U-visa information from the EEOC because that
“discovery would inhibit Congress’s purpose in enacting the
159. Id. at 550.
160. Id. at 551.
161. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Koch’s argument that Section 1367
does not apply to the EEOC because it is not explicitly listed as a “covered agency,” an argument
the district court rejected because the implementing regulation expanded the scope of the statute).
162. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 550–51 (alterations in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(e)(ix)(2)
(2016)).
163. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text (discussing DHS’s approval of the EEOC
as a certifying body, permitting it to certify U-visa applications).
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (a)(2) (2012) (“[I]n no case may [any official] . . . permit use by or
disclosure to anyone . . . of any information which relates to an alien who is the beneficiary of an
application for relief . . . .”).
165. Brief of Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC at 44,
Cazorla, 838 F.3d 540 (No. 15-60562). They argued that
Section 1367 merely provides that U-visa information should be kept confidential
by certain governmental agencies and their employees. The plain text does not bar (or
even mention) disclosure in litigation and does not apply to applicants. The failure to
expressly prohibit disclosure in litigation forecloses any argument that the information
is privileged.
Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
166. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 551. The court noted that “as a purely textual matter, it is unclear why
a provision broadly barring any ‘disclosure’ would have to specify ‘including in discovery’ in order
to have effect.” Id. The court cited Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 354–61 (1982), where the
Supreme Court held that a statute barring disclosure of certain census records also barred them
from discovery despite the statute’s silence on evidentiary privilege to these records in civil cases.
Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 551 n.29.
167. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 552 (citing In re England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). In re
England was authored by then-Judge John Roberts, prior to his elevation to the Supreme Court.
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provision.”168 The Fifth Circuit thus did not budge from the
straightforward reading of the statute and regulation and found that Koch
was barred from discovery of U-visa information from the EEOC.
The Fifth Circuit’s application of Section 1367 to the individual
plaintiffs was ultimately as straightforward as the application to the
EEOC. The Fifth Circuit addressed two important textual arguments that
the plaintiffs presented. The first was that by adopting the district court’s
interpretation of Section 1367, the Fifth Circuit would render the statute
meaningless by allowing Koch, and other similar litigants, to get the same
information the court barred from disclosure by the EEOC (or another
covered agency) from the individual plaintiffs themselves.169 The Fifth
Circuit agreed, stating, “ indeed, Koch appears able to get most, if not all,
of the information it wants from the individual claimants.”170 The
plaintiffs argued that interpreting Section 1367 to bar discovery from the
EEOC but not the individual plaintiffs would frustrate Congress’s goal of
fostering reporting of abuse.171 However, the court found that “any
exploration of [congressional] purpose is beside the point” because “§
1367’s text is unambiguous.”172 The Fifth Circuit reasoned “there is no
need to depart from the straightforward text of the statute (i.e., by
implying an additional privilege not explicitly set forth) in order to save
it from superfluity.”173 The court also pointed to other provisions within
Section 1367174 and outside of Section 1367 that would protect
individuals from disclosure, such as attorney-client privilege and
protections under Rule 26(b)(1).175
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ second textual argument, that
under Section 1367(b)(4) individual plaintiffs, like certifying agencies,
have the right to refuse subpoenas seeking information.176 The court
distinguished the two protections by explaining that “[t]he right to
regulate a third party’s disclosure of one’s information is logically
distinct from the right not to personally disclose that information;
conceptually, it is possible, if perhaps unusual, that someone might have
168. Id. (citing In re England, 375 F.3d at 1177–78).
169. Id. at 553.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 552.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 554.
174. Id. The court noted that “as we read it” there are layers of confidentiality “that cannot be
circumvented by subpoenaing individuals” such as the fact that Section 1367 requires a lawsuit. Id.
175. Id. For example, under Rule 26(b)(1), an individual claimant may be able to argue that it
is too burdensome to disclose the records, where an agency may not be able to make the same
argument. Id.
176. Id.
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one but not the other.”177 Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that the district
court correctly interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1367 to bar discovery from the
EEOC, but not from the individual claimants.178
C. Fifth Circuit’s Correction of the District Court’s Rule 26(c)
Balancing Test
Because the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that Section
1367 did not protect against U-visa discovery from individual claimants,
its next step was to discuss the district court’s balancing test under Rule
26(c).179 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that there was a
conspicuous lack of precedent: “[T]his dispute presents an issue of first
impression in our circuit, much of the precedent the parties deem relevant
is not, and what remains is equivocal.”180 In analyzing the nonbinding
precedent, the court distinguished between two types of cases: those cases
where immigration benefits were alleged to motivate claims, and those
that did not.181 In the latter, the Fifth Circuit explained that courts usually
reject any discovery into immigration status, reasoning that it is hard to
argue the status in itself is “important enough evidence of plaintiffs’
broader credibility to be discoverable.”182 In the former, the Fifth Circuit
noted that “where immigration status and benefits have related more
directly to the parties’ claims, defenses, and credibility” there have been
divergent findings among the lower courts.183 The court cited to both
David and Camayo as two diverging opinions.184 Because of the lack of
guidance, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court was correct in at
least recognizing that it would have to embark on its own Rule 26(c)
balancing analysis.185 The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the U-visa information had

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 555. The Fifth Circuit broke down the district court’s opinion’s main points as
follows: the lack of relevant and binding case law, the fact that the discovery Koch sought was
probative of its defense, and that ultimately the relevance of that information outweighed any in
terrorem effect. See supra Part I.D.
180. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 555.
181. Id. at 555–56.
182. Id. at 556. In a footnote, the Fifth Circuit listed district court cases, both reported and
unreported, including a case involving the EEOC that rejected “Defendants’ argu[ment] that the
charging parties’ credibility is directly relevant and therefore, they should be able to inquire about
falsification of identity and immigration status.” Id. at 556 n.51 (alteration in original) (quoting
EEOC v. Bice of Chi., 229 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005)).
183. Id. at 556.
184. Id. at 556–57, 557 n.55; see generally Part I.C (discussing David and Camayo).
185. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 557.
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probative value.186 The court did not accept all of the district court’s
findings. For example, the court was unpersuaded by the district court’s
finding that the only reason there was a spike in claims was because
employees were filing false claims.187 However, the court still found it
plausible that some of the claims could be false, or partly false, given the
opportunity to obtain a visa.188 Whether the district court’s balancing test
was undertaken correctly was still up for debate in the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion.189
The Fifth Circuit then discussed four factors in coming to its decision
on whether the plaintiffs’ and the public’s interest in preventing U-visa
discovery outweighed the probative value of the information: (1) the
“Claimants’ fears of being fired”; (2) the “Claimants’ fears of being
reported”; (3) “[t]he extent of additional discovery”; and (4) “the burden
on non-claimants.”190 This section of the decision—and each of these
factors—will likely create far-reaching effects for future litigants, who
have statutory discovery protection of their U-visa information when
requested by defendants from the EEOC, but somehow lack that
protection when the same information is requested from the individual,
leading to protracted litigation.
1. Claimants’ Fears of Being Fired
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the
claimants’ fears of being fired were unfounded or illegitimate.191 Because
the protective order entered by the district court permitted the U-visa
information to be used “for purposes unrelated to this litigation if
186. Id. at 558.
187. Id. The Fifth Circuit noted that there could be varying reasons for the spike in claims. For
example, the EEOC could have found more claimants to come forward during the course of its
investigation. Id. (“The EEOC’s involvement could have caused the case’s ranks to swell for any
number of legitimate reasons; most obviously, the EEOC may have discovered additional
harassment claimants during the pre-suit conciliation and investigation processes.”). Additionally,
the court acknowledged the multiple safeguards that are in place to protect against fraud. Id.
188. Id. at 559.
189. Id. The Fifth Circuit summarized the district court’s Rule 26 analysis:
After finding U visa discovery relevant, the court turned to the other side of the ledger,
analyzing whether the discovery would create an undue burden. It reasoned that the
claimants did not need to fear being fired once Koch discovered that they sought U visas,
since most of them no longer worked for the company and others “may have other
protection” or could be sheltered by a protective order. . . . For these reasons, the court
concluded, the relevance of the discovery sought outweighed any burden it might
impose.
Id.
190. Id. at 559–64. Some of these factors were discussed by the district court, but some of them
were not.
191. Id. at 559–60.
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‘required by relevant law,’” the court found that employees would likely
be fired as a result of disclosure because it is illegal to knowingly employ
an undocumented worker, and the disclosure of U-visa information could
lead to Koch discovering undocumented workers.192 The court found that
the claimants and their families legitimately feared discovery,
particularly because Koch could engage in retributive firing while
maintaining the firing was legal.193 The Fifth Circuit did recognize the
fear was “highly speculative” in this specific case given the fact that it
was unclear how many claimants remained employed at Koch or how
many of those claimants filed for U-visas.194 Ultimately, that did not
dissuade the court from recognizing there was a legitimate risk to the
claimants and their families of losing their jobs, and this factor became
an element considered in the balancing test.195
2. Claimants’ Fears of Being Reported
Much like the district court’s analysis regarding the claimants’ fears of
being fired, the Fifth Circuit also found the lower court “downplay[ed]”
the claimants’ fears of Koch reporting them to immigration authorities
should their U-visa information be discoverable.196 Even with a
protective order in place barring Koch from taking such retributive
action, the Fifth Circuit was not convinced, stating instead, “[a] protective
order would not necessarily quell claimants’ fear of suffering [retributive
firing], regardless of Koch’s intent to comply with the order.”197
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit did not find compelling the district court’s
reasoning that, because those claimants who had submitted U-visa
applications had already revealed their status to federal bodies such as the
EEOC and USCIS, their fear of being reported was illegitimate.198
Instead, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, “[a]n abuse victim might well be
willing to disclose sensitive information to a few sympathetic officials,
yet nonetheless fear that his or her abuser might obtain that information
192. Id. (noting that “Koch said earlier in the litigation that it will fire [plaintiffs] if it turns out
they are undocumented” which “is unsurprising” because “it is illegal to knowingly employ an
undocumented worker, and U visa discovery would necessarily show Koch which of its employees
are undocumented”). The Fifth Circuit explained that it was “uncertain” whether the “required by
relevant law” language could protect the employees because “doing so might force Koch to violate
the law.” Id. at 560.
193. Id. at 560.
194. Id.
195. Id. (“Nonetheless, if claimants have applied for U visas, their jobs may still be on the line,
contrary to the district court’s apparent belief.”).
196. Id. at 561.
197. Id. The court also noted that “employers commonly and unlawfully retaliate against
irksome workers by reporting or threatening to report them to immigration authorities.” Id.
198. Id.
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and spread it far and wide.”199 The court found that the mere fact a
claimant disclosed his or her immigration status to particular authorities
did not automatically indicate that a claimant could not legitimately fear
disclosure to other bodies resulting in deportation.200 Therefore, the court
found it reasonable to add this effect of disclosure to the balancing test in
the plaintiffs’ favor.201
3. The Extent of Additional Discovery
Having already found that the U-visa information was relevant to the
litigation, the Fifth Circuit further explained, if discovery of U-visa
information was ultimately permitted, “it should not be barred simply
because other impeachment evidence exists.”202 The plaintiffs disputed
the quantity of discovery, not the quality, therefore the Fifth Circuit
reminded the parties that the “quantity of additional discovery remains
within the district court’s discretion to control.”203 The court was
satisfied with the district court’s assurance that it would not allow a
“fishing expedition” and reinforced the contention that the plaintiffs
could seek relief from any “unduly burdensome demands” with the
district court.204
4. The Burden on Non-Claimants
In deciding this last piece of the balancing test, the Fifth Circuit found
the district court’s lack of discussion concerning how “U visa litigation
might intimidate individuals outside this litigation, compromising the U
visa program and law enforcement efforts more broadly”205 most
pressing. The Fifth Circuit found that the district court “could and should”
have considered the EEOC’s interests and the interests of the broader
public in its Rule 26 balancing test.206 The court reasoned that there are
thousands of people who apply for U-visas each year, and the district
court did a disservice to the public by only looking at the chilling effect
U-visa discovery would have on the specific claimants in this case.207
The Fifth Circuit elaborated:
Allowing U visa discovery from the claimants themselves in this
high-profile case will undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of those
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Congressionally sanctioned assurances and may sow confusion over
when and how U visa information may be disclosed, deterring
immigrant victims of abuse—many of whom already mistrust the
government—from stepping forward and thereby frustrating
Congress’s intent in enacting the U visa program.208

The Fifth Circuit explained that this broader chilling effect was a
“serious concern” for the EEOC, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB),209 and state and federal departments of labor that have the
power to certify U-visa applications.210 Relying on law review articles
and other social science studies on the topic,211 the court found credible
evidence suggesting that immigrants are one of the most vulnerable
groups when it comes to workplace abuse because their status makes
them “highly reluctant” to report abuse for fear of retaliation, and they
are particularly susceptible to threats of deportation.212 If this information
was readily discoverable, agencies like the EEOC and the NLRB would
be unable to reassure those who do come forward that the statutory
protections or protective orders are sufficient, cutting directly against
Congress’s intent in passing the U-visa program and keeping this
information privileged under most circumstances.213 Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit feared these agencies would be unable to “reassure potential
claimants that although U visa discovery was allowed in this case, it will
not be allowed in their cases.”214 The Fifth Circuit looked beyond the
effects its ruling would have on the parties before it and instead noted that
virtually all immigrant abuse cases which the EEOC and other
employment agencies handle have the same elements.215 Therefore,
ruling completely in favor of Koch would create Fifth Circuit precedent
allowing such broad discovery that would be harmful to others outside of

208. Id. at 562–63 (footnotes omitted).
209. The NLRB filed an amicus brief in this case, which will be discussed at length in Part III.
See generally Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae Urging Partial Reversal in Support of
Appellant Cross-Appellee EEOC, Cazorla, 838 F.3d 540 (15-60562), 2015 WL 6506234
[hereinafter Brief for the NLRB].
210. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 563.
211. Id. at 563 n.77. For general background information and to review the articles the Fifth
Circuit cited, see Kati L. Griffith, Undocumented Workers: Crossing the Borders of Immigration
and Workplace Law, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 611, 616–17 (2012) (discussing a 2008 survey
of 4387 low-wage immigrant workers in three cities suggesting that immigrants are
disproportionately likely to experience wage-and-hour violations); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants
and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 676–79 (2003) (collecting evidence that
undocumented workers underreport labor violations).
212. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 563.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 563–64.

492

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

this litigation.216
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit remanded the issue to the district court,
having found the district court “confined its focus to the interests of the
individuals before it.”217 The Fifth Circuit, “having weighed all of the
problems U visa discovery may cause against Koch’s admittedly
significant interest in obtaining the discovery,” concluded that the
discovery the district court approved imposed an undue burden on the
individual plaintiffs and needed to be redefined.218
III. IGNORED ARGUMENTS RESULT IN IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES
The Fifth Circuit was succinct yet thorough in its opinion.219 The Fifth
Circuit was correct that there was a conspicuous lack of precedent—there
were virtually no cases in other circuits on point, and when addressed in
the lower courts, apart from being nonbinding, the opinions were often
irrelevant given the particular facts. Overall, the opinion gives strong
voice to the important policy implications the district court failed to
address, namely the congressional intent behind the U-visa program.220
But, the opinion leaves a loophole for future employers charged with the
same workplace harassment to obtain information that would be barred
had they asked for the same information from a government body.221
A. Missed Argument for A Total Bar of the Discoverability of This
Information via Rule 26(c)
At the very beginning of Section IV of its opinion, the Fifth Circuit
discussed its legal standard of review under Rule 26.222 Importantly, it
discussed the plaintiffs’ argument that the district court erred in assigning
them the burden of proof to show good cause under Rule 26(c)(1), rather
than Koch.223 In their brief, the plaintiffs advanced a legally sound
216. Id. at 564.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See supra note 145 (noting the Fifth Circuit recognized the case was years old and still
only in the discovery stage).
220. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s finding
that the district court failed to weigh the broader chilling effect its order might have on non-parties,
which would undermine Congress’s policy objectives in enacting the U-visa program).
221. See Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, supra note 2, at 42 (“[T]his Court should not entertain
attempts by the perpetrator, his employer, or any other person to seek an alternative means of
obtaining confidential information that the government is forbidden from providing and that was
intended to remain out of their hands.”). The NIWAP is correct in noting this is simply a loophole
to discover information Congress clearly did not want discovered.
222. See supra notes 154–156 (noting that the plaintiffs waived this argument because they
failed to raise it in the district court).
223. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 549 (urging the Fifth Circuit “to hold that U-visa information is . . .
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argument: that other courts have held that certain types of information are
so presumptively sensitive that the party seeking discovery initially bears
the burden of proving a particular need for the information.224 Therefore,
if Koch wanted the sensitive U-visa information, it had the burden to
show a particularized need.225 For procedural reasons, the Fifth Circuit
did not permit the plaintiffs to raise this argument because “[b]urdenshifting, presumptions of sensitivity, references to tax-return cases, and
the like are wholly absent both from the district court’s opinion and from
plaintiffs’ motions opposing U visa discovery.”226
The Fifth Circuit could have accepted this “compelling” argument and
remanded the case with instructions to shift the initial burden onto Koch
to show a “particularized need” for the information.227 However, because
the plaintiffs did not introduce this argument in the district court, the only
way they could have brought it before the Fifth Circuit would have been
to argue in their brief there were “extraordinary circumstances” allowing
this argument to be brought for the first time on appeal.228 In order to
show extraordinary circumstances did exist, plaintiffs would have had to
plead that “the issue involved is a pure question of law and a miscarriage
of justice would result from [the court’s] failure to consider it.”229 In the
presumptively sensitive information, and the party seeking this information always bears the burden
of proving a particularized need for it” (alteration in original)).
224. See Brief for Intervenors, supra note 154, at 13–15 (arguing that, like tax returns and
confidential settlement agreements, U-visa information is presumptively sensitive and shifts the
burden of proof to the requesting party).
225. Id.; see also Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 549 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ argument).
226. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 549–50. The court continued:
In their appeal briefing, plaintiffs reference several points in the record where they
purportedly pressed their argument, but each shows, at most, that plaintiffs occasionally
used the term “need” and advocated a balancing approach in contesting whether Koch
was entitled to the discovery it sought. This did not suffice to preserve the more elaborate
theory they advance on appeal.
Id. at 550. Indeed, there is no mention of this argument in the district court opinion. See generally
Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10cv135-DPJ-FKB, 2014 WL 281979 (S.D. Miss.
Jan. 24, 2014).
227. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 549 (“Plaintiffs’ argument, however compelling, is waived.”).
228. See id. at 549 n.23 (quoting AG Acceptance Corp. v. Veigel, 564 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir.
2009)) (“Under this Circuit’s general rule, arguments not raised before the district court are waived
and will not be considered on appeal unless the party can demonstrate ‘extraordinary
circumstances.’”). The Cazorla court also noted, “Plaintiffs do not argue that extraordinary
circumstances are present here.” Id. Given the high bar to raising unpreserved issues on appeal, it
is unlikely the plaintiffs would have been successful even if they had tried.
229. N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San Juan, 90 F.3d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 1996); see
also AG Acceptance Corp., 564 F.3d at 700–01 (holding that the plaintiffs’ briefing was “devoid
of any argument that a miscarriage of justice would result from [the court not] consider[ing] the
. . . issue. . . . [B]ecause the [plaintiffs] have failed to identify any harm resulting from the district
court’s . . . ruling, we decline to consider their substantive argument for the first time on appeal.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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plaintiffs’ brief there is no pleading of extraordinary circumstances;
instead, the brief focused on why U-visa information was presumptively
sensitive, analogous to tax returns and presentence investigation reports,
and not on the miscarriage of justice argument.230 As “compelling” as the
argument may have been, the plaintiffs failed to raise it, and so the Fifth
Circuit was correct in finding it waived. Even if the argument had been
properly raised, Koch would still have been unable to meet its burden of
showing a “particularized need” for the U-visa information.231
The Fifth Circuit and the district court agreed that some of the U-visa
information was relevant to Koch’s defenses.232 Ultimately, even if the
burden had shifted as the plaintiffs wanted, it is possible that the Fifth
Circuit would have still held Koch had a particularized need for the
information.233 Regardless, the plaintiffs put forward three cases in their
brief to argue that “[e]ven relevant information may be withheld if,
considering the parties’ needs, the information is unnecessary to fair
determination of the merits.”234 The three cases cited, however, are
distinctly different from the present case. Given that the Fifth Circuit
disregarded cases that were not factually analogous, it’s unlikely the court
would have found this argument persuasive.235 While this may be
230. See Brief for Intervenors, supra note 154, at 14–15. The brief’s Rule 26 burden-shifting
analysis only analogizes the U-visa information with other presumptively sensitive information
before going on to discuss how Koch must prove it had a particularized need for the information
that outweighed its inherent sensitivity. Nowhere in the brief do the plaintiffs make an
“extraordinary circumstances” argument. See generally id.
231. Cazorla, 838 F.3d. at 549. The Fifth Circuit did not go into this argument because it did
not shift the burden to Koch under Rule 26(c). However, in the individual plaintiffs’ brief, it is
argued that the district court only took into consideration the relevance of the information and did
not evaluate Koch’s actual need for the information. Brief for Intervenors, supra note 154, at 19.
232. Cazorla, 838 F.3d. at 559 (“[A]lthough plaintiffs’ claims are facially credible, and
although the possibility that immigration benefits may have induced some claimants to step forward
does not necessarily suggest that their claims are false, we find it plausible that some undocumented
immigrants might be tempted to stretch the truth in order to obtain lawful status—and perhaps even
lawful permanent status—for themselves and their families. . . . Given this . . . we cannot conclude
that the district court abused its discretion in finding U visa discovery relevant and potentially
probative of fraud.”).
233. Based on Fifth Circuit precedent, Koch would have had to show a “compelling,
particularized need for disclosure,” assuming the U-visa information was presumptively sensitive.
United States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Corbitt, 879
F.2d 224, 239 (7th Cir. 1989)).
234. See Brief for Intervenors, supra note 154, at 19 (citing Bogan v. City of Boston, 489 F.3d
417, 423–24 (1st Cir. 2007); Moore v. Armour Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 119 F.R.D. 625, 627–28
(E.D.N.Y. 1988)).
235. For example, under the Rule 26 analysis, the Fifth Circuit noted the presented case law
was not binding and distinguishable before engaging in its own balancing test. Cazorla, 838 F.3d
at 555 (noting that “much of the precedent the parties deem relevant is not, and what remains is
equivocal”).
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considered a missed opportunity for the plaintiffs in not pleading the
correct standard, the Fifth Circuit established that legally there would be
no burden shifting.236 Had the brief been pled in this manner, with a focus
on a “miscarriage of justice,” this may have been a completely different
case.
B. Missed Argument for A Total Bar of the Discoverability of This
Information via Statute
Another potentially harmful move the Fifth Circuit made was shifting
one of the plaintiffs’ most important arguments from a statutory
interpretation issue to a Rule 26 issue.237 In their brief, the plaintiffs
argued that there is, in fact, a total bar to the discoverability of U-visa
information based on a side-by-side reading of Sections 1367(a)(2) and
1367(b)(4).238 Section 1367(a)(2) bars government agencies from
permitting “use by or disclosure to anyone . . . of any information which
relates to an alien who is the beneficiary of an application” for a
U-visa.239 Section 1367(b)(4) allows individual U-visa applicants to
waive the privilege stated in subsection (a)(2).240 Plaintiffs argued that,
when read together, the statutes indicate “U-visa information is privileged
whether held by the government or by the U-visa applicant.”241 The
236. It may seem like a draconian result, particularly in this case where simply raising the
burden-shifting argument could have created completely different outcome. However, this rule is
necessary because, without it, the appellate court would be flooded with last-minute arguments and
would be unable to review the district court’s opinion. And this general rule is well applied
throughout the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746
F.3d 167, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiff did not present his argument that the
defendant failed to prove certain elements of his claim at the district court or tribal courts, therefore
waiving the issue on appeal); Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. Clayton, 689 F. App’x 363, 370 (5th
Cir. 2017) (holding that the plaintiffs’ challenges to the arbitration agreement would not be
accepted by the court because the challenges were not brought up in the district court).
237. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 552–53. The plaintiffs argued that interpreting Section 1367 to permit
discovery of U-visa information from the plaintiffs (as opposed to the EEOC) would frustrate the
statute’s goal of fostering reporting of abuse. Id. at 552. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument
out of hand because “§ 1367’s text is unambiguous, any exploration of purpose is beside the point.”
Id. Nonetheless, the court found that the plaintiffs’ “argument has weight” and “the harm Koch’s
desired discovery might cause to Congress’s purposes is highly relevant to our Rule 26 analysis.”
Id. at 553.
238. Brief for Intervenors, supra note 154, at 10 (arguing that “[u]nless U-visa information held
by individuals is as privileged as that same information held by the government, the words of §§
1367(a)(2) and (b)(4) are meaningless. . . . Even if the statutory text could have been clearer, the
text that appears in §§ 1367(a)(2) and (b)(4), read in conjunction with 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(e)(2),
establishes that U-visa information held by the government and by U-visa applicants must be
equally privileged.”).
239. 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2) (2012).
240. § 1367(b)(4) (“Subsection (a)(2) of this section shall not apply if all the battered individuals
in the case are adults and they have all waived the restrictions of such subsection.”).
241. Brief for Intervenors, supra note 154, at 9.
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plaintiffs argued that “government privilege for U-visa information
would be practically useless without an individual privilege.” 242 As stated
previously, the Fifth Circuit ultimately rejected this argument.243
The Fifth Circuit’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ argument, that Section
1367 provides a total bar to discovery from both government agencies
and the individual claimants, can be seen as both a strength and a
weakness of this opinion.244 It is a strength insofar as the court performed
a straightforward interpretation of the statue, which many legal scholars
see as the only way to increase predictability—and decrease
ambiguity—should the issue be litigated in the future.245 It is a weakness
in that the court had the opportunity to use its appropriate judicial
discretion246 to read an absolute bar to U-visa information and further
public policy goals.247 In using its appropriate judicial discretion, the
Fifth Circuit could have taken into account the congressional intent
behind the statute, instead of looking at it from a “purely interpretive
standpoint.”248 But, likely believing that the issue could be resolved
under a Rule 26 analysis, it chose the straightforward approach.249 It is
likely that the Fifth Circuit adopted this approach because it simply saw
this U-visa information as relevant to the defense and thus, purely from a
242. Id.
243. Supra notes 167–176 and accompanying text.
244. Federal and appellate judges face a variety of issues on their daily dockets, but a good
portion of those cases involve statutory interpretation issues. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13–14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (noting that
“[b]y far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is to interpret the meaning of federal
statutes and federal agency regulations,” and referring to statutory interpretation as “the principal
business of judges and (hence) lawyers”).
245. Statutory interpretation has been an issue debated among legal scholars and judges in the
past fifty years. Some believe that there should be a statutory interpretation methodology, such as
a Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, to bring lower courts more in line and mitigate future
litigation. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008) (arguing that courts should treat statutory interpretation
questions with the highest regard to stare decisis). See generally Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement
(First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 364 (2004) (concluding,
“A Restatement of Statutory Interpretation has the potential to do for statutory interpretation what
the Restatement of Contracts did for contracts and might move us a bit closer to having a shared,
authoritative interpretive regime. It could be either an alternative to something like the Federal
Rules of Statutory Interpretation or a precursor to such rules.”).
246. It is not uncommon for a circuit court to adopt a straightforward reading of statutes,
however, opposite those legal scholars who believe there needs to be Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, are those who understand that due to the “inherent imprecision of language and the
severe limitations on legislative foresight,” courts should and do have considerable interpretive
leeway. Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209,
226 (2015).
247. The harmful effects will be discussed in Part IV, infra.
248. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 553 (5th Cir. 2016).
249. Id. at 554.
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relevance standpoint, determined it should be allowed for discovery
under Rule 26.250 The Fifth Circuit’s commitment to a straightforward
interpretation in this case mandated its inequitable ruling. The court
deferred to a harmful procedural analysis based on the questionable
existence of fraud, knowing the potential effects and protecting the
information from discovery through the EEOC, and acting in direct
opposition to plain-text interpretation of a federal statute passed with
bipartisan support. A total bar without precedent to fall back on may have
seemed risky in the eyes of the court, but necessary. 251
C. Why the Fifth Circuit Found the Labor Agencies’ Arguments Most
Persuasive
The Fifth Circuit correctly recognized that the district court did not
give enough credence to government labor agencies such as the EEOC
and NLRB and other federal and state departments of labor, all of which
certify U-visa applications.252 In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit discussed
directly the “serious concern” that would arise if this information was
discoverable from the individual plaintiffs or EEOC and NLRB given the
“[c]onsiderable evidence suggest[ing] that immigrants are
disproportionately vulnerable to workplace abuse and, not coincidentally,
highly reluctant to report it for fear of discovery and retaliation.”253
250. Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties are allowed to request
discovery that supports a claim or defense. The district court, the Fifth Circuit, and a variety of
other courts see this information as relevant and thus allow discovery under Rule 26 unless
otherwise barred. See supra Part II.
251. The Fifth Circuit explicitly noted that there was a lack of precedent and that courts were
split on a case-by-case basis, stating,
Although courts have often barred discovery of immigration-related information, in
many of these cases, immigration benefits were not alleged to have motivated or shaped
the claims at issue and did not otherwise affect the plaintiffs’ right to relief. In such cases,
courts have frequently rejected the notion that immigration status is itself important
enough evidence of plaintiffs’ broader credibility to be discoverable.
But where immigration status and benefits have related more directly to the parties’
claims, defenses, and credibility, as here, district courts have reached divergent results.
Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 555–56.
252. Id. at 562 (stating, “These dynamics jeopardize the EEOC’s interests and those of the
broader public. The district court could and should have weighed them in its Rule 26 analysis. But
its analysis considered only the immediate chilling effect of U visa discovery on the individual
claimants in this case.”).
253. Id. at 563. The Fifth Circuit cited to many secondary sources to bolster this statement, but
the most persuasive is a study done at the University of Illinois at Chicago Center for Urban
Economic Development. Id. at 563 n.77. As the court noted,
The study found, in an analysis of 1,186 Chicago immigrant workers, “undocumented
workers more often experience unsafe working conditions than do immigrants with legal
status,” that they file claims less frequently than would be expected given their rates of
reported serious injury and unsafe working conditions, and that there is a strong and

498

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

The EEOC and amicus NLRB briefs are rife with real-life examples
and common-sense workplace knowledge that likely persuaded the Fifth
Circuit in its decision.254 The NLRB’s main argument for disallowing the
discoverability of U-visa information was that it would incentivize
employers to hire undocumented workers, unfairly penalize businesses
that were not engaging in hiring undocumented workers, and “exert[]
downward pressure on the working conditions of citizens and other
authorized workers.”255 Because of that incentive, immigration status has
been used in the past to strong-arm employees to remain silent when
employers commit potentially criminal acts.256 The Fifth Circuit also
accepted the NLRB’s argument that “inquiries” without limits would
chill cooperation of not only those employees whose status is being
questioned, but also those employees who may want to come forward but
do not after seeing the ramifications.257
This argument is fully supported by case law, and is not a new issue
statistically significant correlation between undocumented status and wage and hour
complaints.
Id.
254. See, e.g., Brief for the NLRB, supra note 209, at 7 (“On the basis of its long experience in
protecting the statutory rights of workers, the NLRB has concluded that ‘undocumented aliens are
extremely reluctant to complain to the employer or to any of the agencies charged with enforcing
workplace standards for fear that they will lose their jobs or risk detection and ultimately
deportation.’” (quoting A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 414 (1995))). “More
recently, two Board members observed that undocumented workers ‘face a double risk in taking
concerted action—not just as employees asserting their Section 7 right . . . but as undocumented
immigrants at risk of deportation.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mezonos Maven Bakery,
Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376, 379 (2011) (concurring opinion), aff’d in part and remanded in part on
other grounds sub nom. Palma v. NLRB, 723 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2013)).
255. Brief for the NLRB, supra note 209, at 5.
256. The NLRB noted other examples, including Prof’l Research, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 96, 96–97
(1975), which found “that a union’s threat of deportation if employee refused to sign authorization
card interfered with free choice and warranted setting aside election.” Brief for the NLRB, supra
note 209, at 6. It also cited John Dory Boat Works, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 844, 852 (1977), which held
“that subpoenas probing into immigration status interfered with witnesses’ ability to testify.” Brief
for the NLRB, supra note 209, at 6. The brief further cited Viracon, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 245, 247
(1981), which found “that employer’s threats of deportation if employees elected union
representation were unlawful coercion.” Brief for the NLRB, supra note 209, at 6.
257. See Brief for the NLRB, supra note 209, at 11 (citing Flaum Appetizing Corp., 357
N.L.R.B. 2006, 2011–12 (2011)). There is already a stigma surrounding those who come forward
in sexual assault cases regardless of immigration status. Combining that fact with the
employee-employer relationship and the possibility of being deported, the Fifth Circuit was correct
in remanding the case to fully address the chilling effect of such discovery. See Michelle J.
Anderson, Note, A License to Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102
YALE L.J. 1401, 1402–03 (1993) (describing how not only are women in the United States highly
statistically likely to be abused regardless of status, but those with conditional status, such as relying
on a husband or corporation to supply a work visa, are even more likely to be abused); Husain &
Orloff, supra note 104 (providing statistics on immigrant women demographics relating to work
and violence).
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for labor agencies. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Fuentas v. INS noted
than an employer only reported undocumented workers that he had
underpaid for three years when they filed suit to recover wages they were
owed.258 The Ninth Circuit later held, in 2000, that plaintiffs would be
allowed to plead their claims in the case anonymously, due to their fear
of retaliatory deportation.259 In Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R’s Oil, Inc., a
district court addressed a situation where an employer had systematically
recruited undocumented workers and then reported them to the
authorities when any of the employees would file suit for unpaid
wages.260 These cases are just a few of many examples the NLRB cited.
As a result, the Fifth Circuit correctly recognized the discoverability of
U-visas would cause a chilling effect.261
Even though the Fifth Circuit correctly found that bodies like the
EEOC and NLRB would have a legitimate interest in keeping this
sensitive information private, it did not completely defer to their policies
when coming to its ultimate decision. For example, the NLRB has a
specific procedure in place for deciding if immigration status is even
necessary to bring up at all in similar proceedings.262 Internal policy
dictates the NLRB conduct a well-thought-out and articulated balancing
between the employer’s interests “in supporting the defense against the
chilling effect an employer’s inquiries will have on current and potential
Board witnesses.”263 And, the NLRB should consider “whether the

258. Fuentes v. I.N.S., 765 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 844 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1988).
259. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2000).
260. Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R’s Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
261. The EEOC also supported the NLRB’s contentions in its own brief, citing to multiple cases
where the chilling effect of allowing such information to be discoverable would be inappropriate.
Response and Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Cross-Appellee EEOC at 58, Cazorla v. Koch
Foods Miss. L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-60562) [hereinafter EEOC Reply Brief].
See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The chilling effect
[immigration status] discovery could have on the bringing of civil rights actions unacceptably
burdens the public interest.”); EEOC v. Bice of Chi., 229 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding
immigration status discovery “would have a chilling effect on victims of employment
discrimination from coming forward to assert discrimination claims”).
262. “Because undocumented workers are employees protected by the NLRA, the Board has
long held that an employee’s immigration status is not relevant to the determination of whether a
respondent—employer or union—has violated the Act.” Brief for the NLRB, supra note 209, at 14
(citation omitted).
263. Brief for the NLRB, supra note 209, at 16. The NLRB has limited probes into immigration
status in this way after being confronted with the issue in countless cases. See generally Flaum
Appetizing Corp., 357 N.L.R.B. 2006 (2011) (holding that employers have to “articulate a basis for
pleading an affirmative defense” because of which it may need to subpoena certain immigration
documents); Farm Fresh Co., 361 N.L.R.B. 848 (2014) (holding that the Board will also consider
whether the defense may support its case through other evidence).
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defense can be supported through other means.”264 This may sound
similar to the Rule 26 balancing test that the Fifth Circuit used; however,
both the EEOC and NLRB urged the court to look at whether alternative
means could be used to assess the issue of the claimants’ credibility.265
The EEOC and the NLRB partially concluded in their briefs that the
district court failed to address the fact that Koch could have tested a
claimant’s credibility in alternative ways, such as witness testimony and
the weight of respective evidence or admitted facts. 266 The Fifth Circuit
did not address whether the information could be procured by alternative
means, only that the information was presumptively relevant.267
Ultimately, it is within the Fifth Circuit’s purview to include or exclude
whatever factors it wishes from a Rule 26 balancing test, within certain
limits.268 But, because the NLRB and EEOC are the agencies that certify
U-visa applications, and they deal heavily in undocumented worker
complaints every day and have firsthand knowledge of what works and
what does not, the Fifth Circuit was counterproductive in failing to defer
to them in its decision.269
D. Missing Intersection Between Immigration and Sexual Assault or
Harassment in the Workplace
The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that the district court did not correctly
264. Brief for the NLRB, supra note 209, at 17 (citing Farm Fresh Co., 361 N.L.R.B. 848).
265. Brief for the NLRB, supra note 209, at 22–23; EEOC Reply Brief, supra note 261, at
55–58.
266. Brief for the NLRB, supra note 209, at 22–23 (citing In re Double D. Constr. Grp., Inc.,
339 N.L.R.B. 303, 305 (2003)).
267. The Fifth Circuit opinion does not mention that alternative means of gaining the
information was taken into account.
268. See Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 555 (5th Cir. 2016). The court
described the review as follows:
“[T]he federal courts have superimposed a somewhat demanding balancing of interests
approach to the Rule. Under the balancing standard, the district judge must compare the
hardship to the party against whom discovery is sought against the probative value of
the information to the other party.” Courts also weigh relevant public interests in this
analysis.
Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL, MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 26.101(1)(c) (3d ed. 2011)).
269. The Fifth Circuit is not bound by NLRB or EEOC policies, but, arguably, they should be
given deference. If the NLRB and EEOC both believe, based on their experiences with allowing
discovery from individual plaintiffs, that it would harm their overall goals, the Fifth Circuit should
have given greater deference to them. But, courts often disregard the EEOC’s interpretations. See
Theodore W. Wern, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the
ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC A Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533 (1999)
(discussing why the EEOC rarely gets judicial deference in regard to its interpretations of certain
statues such as the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
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address how disclosing U-visa information would affect those outside its
decision in Cazorla.270 The Fifth Circuit deferred slightly to the EEOC
and NLRB’s findings, but failed to fully flesh out the ramifications this
decision would have on future immigration policies of other agencies,271
such as the National Immigrant Women’s Advocacy Project
(NIWAP),272 LatinoJustice PRLDEF,273 and Legal Momentum.274
Ninety-four other organizations also filed as amici, ranging from law
professors to various women’s groups advocating on behalf of sexual
assault survivors.275 The Fifth Circuit did not accept a majority of the
arguments that the NIWAP amicus brief put forward, such as the
argument that Congress drew on a long history of confidentiality
protections when coming to its decision to protect U-visa disclosure

270. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 562.
The district court’s analysis of the harm that U visa discovery might cause the
claimants was imperfect, but not critically so. More pressing is that the district court did
not address how U visa litigation might intimidate individuals outside this litigation,
compromising the U visa program and law enforcement efforts more broadly.
Id.; see also supra note 40 (discussing U-visas as a crime-fighting tool).
271. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 563.
272. NIWAP is
a non-profit public policy advocacy organization that develops, reforms, and promotes
the implementation and use of laws, policies and practices to improve legal rights,
services and assistance to immigrant women, children and immigrant victims of
domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking and other crimes. . . . Since
2012, NIWAP Inc. has provided 148 trainings attended by 11,000 professionals working
with immigrant victims and offered technical assistance to callers from all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, embassies and
consulates on over 3,500 different matters. NIWAP, Inc. has collaborated with the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (“FLTEC”) in the development of on line mandatory VAWA confidentiality
training for DHS officials.
Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, supra note 2, at 6–7.
273. Id. at 8. LatinoJustice PRLDEF, formerly known as the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund, was established in 1972 and advocates for the equal protection of Latinos in the
workplace. LatinoJustice PRLDEF litigates cases involving “wage theft, discriminatory practices
and unfair workplace conditions, including gender-based discrimination, sexual harassment, and
English-only language polices that limit the rights of Latina/o immigrants to secure equal
employment opportunities in the workplace.” Id.
274. Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, supra note 2, at 8. Legal Momentum was founded in 1970
and
was instrumental in the drafting and passing of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994
and its subsequent reauthorizations in 2000, 2005, and 2013. The organization has served
as counsel and joined amicus curiae in numerous cases to support the rights of victims
of intimate partner violence, sexual assault and other forms of gender-motivated
violence.
Id.
275. For a full list of various groups who consented to the filing of the amicus brief, see Brief
of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, supra note 2, at 1–5.
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under Section 1367.276 Neither did it accept the argument that “courts
should not compel victims to reveal confidential information they
otherwise would not voluntarily reveal to anyone, much less to their
aggressors . . . .”277 The brief argues for a total bar on alleged aggressors
being able to access this information, whereas the Fifth Circuit did not
agree that a total bar is appropriate given the relevance of the
information.278 The amicus brief states that “this Court should not
entertain attempts by the perpetrator, his employer, or any other person
to seek an alternative means of obtaining confidential information that
the government is forbidden from providing and that was intended to
remain out of their hands.”279 NIWAP is correct in noting this is simply
a loophole to discover information Congress clearly sought to protect
from discovery. However, as noted previously, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged, but did not close, this loophole.280
E. Missing Today’s Political Climate
There would not be ninety-four amici if this issue was not salient in
today’s politics, and potentially crucial in determining thousands of
people’s daily working conditions. Fraud is a contentious issue with
U-visas generally, and it was the crux of Koch’s argument in Cazorla.281
By allowing any, if only some, discovery into U-visa information, the
Fifth Circuit may have unintentionally given legal support to the
argument that the U-visa program is flooded with fraud. U-visas have
been, and are, an important tool for the amici groups to help aliens gain
lawful citizenship, but not everyone is as keen on them as the amici
filers.282 Some argue that the U-visa system in general is flawed, such as
Professor Michael Kagan, director of the Immigration Clinic at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas School of Law. Professor Kagan argues
276. Id. at 45 (“The legislative history of the creation of the VAWA confidentiality protections
states that ‘we all know confidentiality is a matter of life and death whether or not they are citizens
or whether they are immigrants. . . If you could imagine if you had an abuser being tried in court
for abuse, he could get the victim deported so she could not testify if we didn’t do this.’” (alteration
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Full Committee Mark Up: Hearing on H.R. 2202 Before the
House Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Representative Patricia Schroeder))).
277. Id. at 48.
278. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 564 (5th Cir. 2016).
279. Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, supra note 2, at 42 (emphasis added).
280. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 553.
281. Id. at 558. Other than the fraud allegations, Koch did not provide a relevant reason for
asking for this discovery.
282. See Zimmerman, supra note 8 (arguing that the rise in U-visa applications is not due to
increased domestic violence toward immigrants, but rather that it is because there is fraud in the
system); see also Pappas, supra note 8 (reporting on an Indiana attorney who had filed false visa
applications for aliens).
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that the U-visa certification creates a “‘quid pro quo system’ that
pressures undocumented immigrants into trading testimony in order to
remain in the United States.”283 Kagan also proposes that U-visa
applicants are particularly “vulnerable to accusations of fraud in the
criminal system because of its adversarial nature.”284
This issue of fraud is not new to the U-visa debate, and many members
of Congress fault the Obama administration for allowing fraudulent
U-visas to be processed.285 But it goes further back than just the previous
administration. When the original U-visa bill was passed, even though it
had broad bipartisan support, some opponents had concerns.286
Republican Representative Lamar Smith of Texas warned that the U-visa
program could “open up our immigration system to widespread fraud as
criminal and illegal aliens learn that the way to defeat our immigration
laws is simply to claim to be battered.”287 The Cazorla decision, reached
just before entering into a term of anti-immigration policies, could send
an implied message to the legal system that fraud is a legitimate issue
with U-visas and an appropriate defense for companies to put forward.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CAZORLA ON CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICY
The Fifth Circuit recognized the public policy implications of allowing
broad discovery into individuals’ U-visa applications and in doing so
remanded the case to the district court “to devise an approach to U visa
discovery that adequately protects the diverse and competing interests at
stake.”288 Due to the current state of immigration policies, however,
anything short of an absolute bar on this information will lead to harmful
effects to those who are legitimate victims and in need of U-visas. In
discussing the impact of Cazorla, it is important to remember that this
case involved a civil action against a company, but as will be discussed
in this section, U-visas impact civil and criminal cases against a variety
of defendants.289 Allowing the discussion of fraudulent U-visa
283. Mankin, supra note 52, at 44.
284. Id.
285. See Grassley Letter, supra note 9; see also Black Press Release, supra note 50.
286. See Roll Call Vote on Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, U.S. SENATE
(2013),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?
congress=113&session=1&vote=00019 (providing a summary of the roll call Senate vote for the
113th Congress, demonstrating that the bill had broad bipartisan support when VAWA was first
passed and reauthorized).
287. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3083 Before the H.
Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 24 (1999)
(statement of Rep. Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims).
288. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 564 (5th Cir. 2016).
289. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s three major goals in
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applications to continue, especially given the current administration’s
stance on immigration, will be detrimental to abuse survivors. 290
Additionally, the fraud aspect of the U-visa applications is unfounded
given the strict requirements that DHS has in place.291 The following
section will discuss the implications of the current administration on the
U-visa program, how Cazorla will continue to negatively impact the Uvisa program, and why U-visa fraud is not as rampant as members of
Congress and the current administration may believe.
A. Impact of Trump Administration on U-visa Program
The current administration zealously advocates for tough laws
regarding immigration, leading to greater fears of deportation, even for
those who are in the United States legally.292 In the 2016 fiscal year,
USCIS received a total of 35,044 U-visa petitions from victims of
criminal activities,293 and approved 10,046.294 During the first fiscal
passing the U-visa program). U-visas may be certified if the applicant is helpful in either a civil or
criminal case. The applicant must also meet the statutory requirements and be the victim of a
qualifying crime.
290. The true ramifications may seem futuristic, but some police departments are citing
deportation fears as having a direct correlation to a decrease in immigrants calling the police
generally. See Cora Engelbrecht, Fewer Immigrants Are Reporting Domestic Abuse. Police Blame
Fear of Deportation., N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/03
/us/immigrants-houston-domestic-violence.html (noting that Houston saw a sixteen percent drop in
domestic violence reports from the Hispanic community despite having one of the fastest-growing
immigration communities in the country, which police attribute to tough enforcement of
immigration laws and the political climate).
291. See DHS GUIDE, supra note 41 (noting that the list of qualifying crimes is intentionally
broad to give law enforcement flexibility).
292. The National Immigration Center recommended that aliens who were brought to the
United States as children who were going to apply for legal status under the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program not do so given the election of President Trump. Ignacia
Rodriguez, Our Recommendations for People Considering Applying for DACA Following the
Election, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nilc.org/news/the-torch/11-14-16/.
The DACA program is just one of many immigration programs that may be ended under the Trump
administration. See Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and
Calls on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/
05/us/politics/trump-daca-dreamers-immigration.html (discussing the general confusion
surrounding Trump’s plans for DACA).
293. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., NUMBER OF I-918 PETITIONS FOR U
NONIMMIGRANT STATUS (VICTIMS OF CERTAIN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES AND FAMILY MEMBERS)
BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, AND CASE STATUS 2009–2017 [hereinafter USCIS 2017 REPORT],
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigrati
on%20Forms%20Data/Victims/I918u_visastatistics_fy2017_qtr1.pdf. In total, there were 60,710
petitions received, which included petitions by family members of the victims. Id.
294. Id. Congress capped the amount of approved U-visas at 10,000 per fiscal year. DHS GUIDE,
supra note 41, at 2. However, many argue that there should be an increase in the U-visa cap in order
to continue the positive effects that have been seen since its implementation. See Lianna E.
Donovan, Note, The Violence Against Women Act’s Protection of Immigrant Victims: Past,
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quarter of 2017,295 the number of U-visa applications received decreased
by 269 from the same time period in 2016—that is, essentially one month
under the current administration.296 While the total number of petitions
received and approved stayed relatively the same between fiscal years
2016 and 2017, there is a noticeable trend of fewer approvals and more
denials.297 Additionally, the current administration’s rhetoric
surrounding immigration may not encourage those who are victims of
crimes to come forward and apply for U-visas, but the true extent to
which that is true will be unknown until more information is gathered.
Police departments in large Hispanic areas, including San Diego, Los
Angeles, and Denver are seeing a downward trend of reporting, while
crime rises.298 And a recent report released by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) found similar trends on a national basis, citing
the following statistics between 2016 and 2017:
Approximately 22 percent of police officers surveyed reported that
immigrants were less likely in 2017 than in 2016 to be willing to make
police reports; 21 percent said immigrant crime survivors were less
likely to help in investigations when police arrived at the scene of a
crime; 20 percent reported that they were less likely to help in
post-crime scene investigations; and 18 percent said immigrant crime
survivors were less willing to work with prosecutors. As a result, law
enforcement officials reported that many crimes have become more
difficult to investigate: 69 percent said domestic violence was harder to
investigate, 64 percent said this applied to human trafficking, and 59
percent said this was true about sexual assault.299

Practically, immigration attorneys are left with uncertainty regarding

Present, and Proposals for the Future, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 745, 767–70 (2014) (arguing that
failing to increase the cap would frustrate law enforcement efforts and create dangerous situations
for victims of violence).
295. The first fiscal quarter ran from October to December of 2017. USCIS 2017 REPORT, supra
note 293.
296. Compare id., with U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., NUMBER OF I-918
PETITIONS FOR U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS (VICTIMS OF CERTAIN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES AND
FAMILY MEMBERS) BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, AND CASE STATUS 2009–2016,
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigrati
on%20Forms%20Data/Victims/I918u_visastatistics_fy2016_qtr1.pdf.
297. Compare USCIS 2017 REPORT, supra note 293, with U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, NUMBER OF I-918 PETITIONS FOR U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS (VICTIMS OF CERTAIN
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES AND FAMILY MEMBERS) BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, AND CASE STATUS
2009–2018,
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20
Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Victims/I918u_visastatistics_fy2018_qtr1.pdf.
298. Engelbrecht, supra note 290.
299. ACLU, FREEZING OUT JUSTICE: HOW IMMIGRATION ARRESTS AT COURTHOUSES ARE
UNDERMINING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2018), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_
document/rep18-icecourthouse-combined-rel01.pdf.
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how to best advise their client as to the ramifications of calling police or
taking their abusers to court.300 According to one study, forty-three
percent of advocates working with aliens who were victims of sexual
assault or other violent crimes had clients drop their civil or criminal
cases because they were afraid of being deported.301 However, much of
the empirical data surrounding U-visa applications is unknown; given the
current information and the testimony of immigration attorneys dealing
with aliens who would normally apply for U-visas, a drop in applications
is occurring.302 The U-visa program mitigated the perilous crossroads
faced by victims to either call the police and save themselves from abuse
or be deported.303 But under the Trump administration, aliens are faced
with the same crossroads as before, and while some are willing to take
the risk, many are not.304 This directly contradicts the congressional
intent of passing the U-visa program in the first place—to give alien
victims the protection and courage they need to engage with law
enforcement for the betterment of the community. 305
300. 2017 Advocate and Legal Services Survey Regarding Immigrant Survivors, TAHIRIH JUST.
CTR. [hereinafter 2017 Advocate and Legal Services Survey], http://www.tahirih.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/2017-Advocate-and-Legal-Service-Survey-Key-Findings.pdf. A DHS
memo released in February 2017 gives broader authority to DHS to crack down on aliens, even
those who are in the process of applying for visas, including U-visas. Memorandum from the
Department
of
Homeland
Security
(Feb.
21,
2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-PresidentsBorder-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf. According to one
immigration attorney, in the past, showing an ICE or CBP agent the slip of paper stating the victim’s
U-visa application had been received indicated that the victim a low priority for deportation. Under
the current administration, that same attorney spoke with ICE and CBP agents who informed him
the same slip of paper would no longer protect the victim from deportation. Nora Caplan-Bricker,
“I Wish I’d Never Called the Police”, SLATE (Mar. 19, 2017, 8:12 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/cover_story/2017/03/u_visas_gave_a_safe_path
_to_citizenship_to_victims_of_abuse_under_trump.html.
301. 2017 Advocate and Legal Services Survey, supra note 300. This is supported by reports of
immigration lawyers’ caution to file U-visa applications on behalf of their clients. See Beth Fertig,
Here’s Why Immigrant Victims May (Still) Be Afraid to Report Crime, WNYC NEWS (Feb. 21,
2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/why-immigrant-victims-may-be-afraid-report-crime-despitefederal-program-help/ (describing some of the problems faced in the lower courts with filing Uvisas).
302. Supra notes 292–301 and accompanying text.
303. See generally NIWAP U-visa Report, supra note 40 (providing testimonials of law
enforcement officials who describe the predicament immigrant women faced when deciding
whether to come forward to report a crime).
304. For detailed stories of victims of abuse facing this crossroads, see Shannon Dooling, ‘I
Was Afraid of Him and of Immigration’: Domestic Violence Survivors Take Chance Applying for
Special Visa, WBUR NEWS (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/news/2017/09/12/increase-uvisa-applications; Kari Lindberg, Human Trafficking Victims Are Scared to Apply for Visas Under
Trump, VICE NEWS (June 12, 2017), https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/434pkj/humantrafficking-victims-are-scared-to-apply-for-visas-under-trump.
305. See supra Part I.A (detailing the legislative history of the U-visa program).
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B. Cazorla Opinion Continues to Negatively Affect U-Visa Program
Fear of reporting crimes for aliens may not be new under the current
administration, though the fear has increased. What the Fifth Circuit
failed to note, but what was not lost on immigration advocacy groups, is
the far-reaching effect this litigation will have on the U-visa program. In
their amicus brief, those groups advocated for the Fifth Circuit to take
into account the negative implications that would affect not only those
that have U-visas,
but all immigrant victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, human
trafficking, child abuse, felonious assault, stalking, extortion, and other
crimes in all VAWA confidentiality protected cases, and in all kinds of
contexts, employment, family, and in the community as a whole.306

This could not be achieved with anything short of a complete bar on
the information that Koch sought to discover.307 By way of example, the
following real-world situation posed by the plaintiffs in their brief to the
Fifth Circuit fleshes out many of the implications anything less than a
total bar would have on the U-visa program even if an application has
already been filed:
[I]mmigrants’ fears of disclosure are justified even if they have applied
for a U-visa. Individuals with pending U-visa applications do not have
legal status and are not work authorized; they are therefore still subject
to detention, deportation, arrest, or loss of livelihood if their application
information is ordered disclosed. The same is true for any applicant
whose application is denied. U-visa applicants reveal information about
family members who may not be applying for U- status and are not
parties to the litigation, and thus may fear the deportation, arrest, or
firing of their relatives if applications are disclosed. This risk remains
even if the applicant’s’ [sic] own U-visa is granted. Also, U-visa status
is not permanent and may be revoked. Fear of revocation is more acute
and reasonable in a case where Defendant threatened to call
immigration authorities as part of the alleged abuse and has repeatedly
accused workers of fabricating their claims. Even the most carefully
crafted protective order cannot allay these very real fears, and the
nuances of any such order cannot easily be parsed by a large class of
workers, many of whom speak only Spanish and have limited formal
education. Moreover, if disclosure of this sensitive information
becomes routine, workers contemplating future claims will likely come
to believe that participation in a lawsuit comes at too high of a price,
and thus may forgo efforts to hold abusive employers accountable.308

306. Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, supra note 2, at 64.
307. Brief for Intervenors, supra note 154, at 27 n.8.
308. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit chose to ignore many of the legitimate arguments
posed by the plaintiffs in the above real-world situation.309 While it may
be important for this “relevant” information to come in for the defendant,
it would have been more legitimate on the grounds of legislative intent
behind VAWA and the U-visa program for the Fifth Circuit to completely
bar this information under a strict reading of Rule 26 and the relevant
statutes.310 The amicus brief filed directly points this out by arguing
“[t]he harm is not limited to and is much greater than concern that
discovery of VAWA confidentiality protected information will lead to
the ‘annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense’
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 seeks to prevent.”311
Additionally, VAWA was passed with bipartisan support intentionally to
protect these vulnerable parties and to convince them to come forward
when they are victims of crime.312 This is especially true when the
defense that defendants like Koch are forwarding is more speculation
than truth. The fundamental safety concerns of the victimized immigrants
must outweigh considerations about litigation and discovery costs for
wealthy employer-defendants like Koch Foods.
C. U-visa “Fraud” Is Not A Legitimate Defense
Under the current administration, and according to Republican pundits,
discussions on visa applications for protective visas, like U-visas, rarely
occur without a cry of “fraud.”313 But how well-founded are these
accusations? If these accusations of “rampant” fraud are mostly

309. It is true that the Fifth Circuit detailed some of the important public policy issues at stake,
but the court ultimately found the relevance of the information just as important. See Cazorla v.
Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 555–62 (5th Cir. 2016) (performing analysis under
Rule 26(c), which “allows the court, ‘for good cause, [to] issue an order’ restricting discovery ‘to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense’” and giving short shrift to the plaintiffs’ concerns of being fired, reported to INS, and
deported (alteration in original)).
310. Rule 26(c)(1) states a court can restrict access to certain discoverable information “for
good cause . . . to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). There is certainly an argument that allowing discovery
into individual plaintiffs’ U-visas will cause all of those things. See Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF,
supra note 2, at 60 (arguing that if the confidential information a victim has provided in a U-visa
application becomes known by the victim’s aggressor, “the perpetrator can use statements to both
intimidate the victim to change or withdraw allegations or use threats and coercion to manipulate
and [] scare the victim so that testimony presented in the civil, family, or criminal case brought
against the abuser will be less credible”).
311. Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, supra note 2, at 61 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)).
312. See supra notes 37–38.
313. See, e.g., Neil Munro, Obama Backdoor Amnesty Provided ‘U visas’ for 140,000 Illegal
Aliens, BREITBART (June 27, 2017), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/06/27/u-vsabecomes-backdoor-amnesty-for-200000-plus/.
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unfounded, by accepting the defense of fraud in order to allow U-visa
discovery, courts essentially allow discovery based on a defense that is
rarely true.314 And while that may be within the court’s discretion, when
combined with the negative public policy effects previously discussed,
particularly where aliens are filing fewer applications for fear of being
deported, the Fifth Circuit has directly permeated this “fraud” discussion
to the detriment of the U-visa program—a program that is already under
fire.
While many Republicans and the current administration may believe
that the U-visa program has created a system of unchecked fraud,315 that
may not be the case.316 Perhaps before asking how fraudulent the U-visa
program really is, the question should be: Why is it so easy to put forward
this accusation against aliens? Many who believe there is fraud in the
program say that the program is an “easy” way to gain lawful
citizenship.317 But again, that is likely not true. The U-visa program is in
fact one of the longest, most evasive and time-consuming ways to try to
gain lawful citizenship, taking almost fifteen years from first filing.318
The process’s lengthiness is often ignored by the current administration
and the conservative media when discussing U-visa fraud. Also ignored
are the ramifications of filing a fraudulent U-visa application, namely,
deportation.319 The U-visa statute specifically states that “[n]othing in
this section prohibits USCIS from instituting removal proceedings . . . for
misrepresentations of material facts . . . .”320 Every alien who files a
U-visa application risks deportation if any one of the certifying bodies
finds their story is not credible.321 In addition, “fraudulent” U-visas are
314. See Black Press Release, supra note 50 (explaining that “[r]ampant fraud and abuse of U
Visas now undermines its effectiveness for law enforcement and circumvents the law abiding
individuals who seek to immigrate to our country through the proper channels”). The primary
reason the Fifth Circuit allowed the discovery was due to the defendants’ defense. Cazorla, 838
F.3d at 559. If that defense is rarely true, then it should not be allowed at all, especially when the
harms that may come from providing such discovery are so severe.
315. Supra text accompanying note 9.
316. Mark Becker, Are Illegal Immigrants Faking Crimes to Stay in the Country, ATLANTA J.CONST. (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/national/9-investigates-illegalimmigrants-faking-crimes-st/nh5Gx/; Liz Klimas, Could This Become a Popular Way Illegal
Immigrants Try to Cheat the System to Stay in the United States?, BLAZE (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.theblaze.com/news/2014/11/12/fake-victims-how-illegal-immigrants-could-stagecrimes-to-obtain-a-special-visa-in-the-u-s.
317. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 316; Klimas, supra note 316. There are many news articles
detailing U-visa fraud, but almost all of them are speculative.
318. Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
319. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(h)(2), (4)(i) (2018).
320. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(h)(4)(i).
321. See DHS GUIDE, supra note 41, at 14 (explaining that “the victim of the crime must possess
credible and reliable information”). Certifying bodies include federal, state, and local law
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inherently difficult to certify given the strict statutory requirements for
U-visas, another element that opponents to the U-visa program seem to
forget.322 Not only must the alien be the victim of a qualifying crime,
they must also be helpful to the investigation or the prosecution of the
case and be certified by the appropriate body.323 Coupled with the fear of
deportation if the U-visa does not end up being issued, the long wait, and
the statutory requirements, “fraud” defenses and allegations are not
enough to overcome the public policy of keeping U-visa information
privileged.
But how fraudulent is the program? This may be a hard question to
answer324; however, in doing so we can look at just how restrictive the
U-visa requirements are and the strict procedures it uses in certifying
U-visas, to conclude generally that U-visas are more legitimate than
fraudulent. The statutory requirements must all be proven to a certifying
body before the application can be filed.325 There are four statutory
eligibility requirements a U-visa applicant must satisfy: (1) “the alien
must have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as result of
having been a victim of a qualifying criminal activity”; (2) the alien must
have information concerning that criminal activity; (3) the alien must
have “been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful” in the
investigation or prosecution of the crime as certified by an appropriate
agency; and (4) the criminal activity violated US laws.326 While the
“qualifying crimes” may be intentionally broad, there is no guarantee that
the alien will be able to meet the requirement for “substantial” abuse.327
This is especially true when coupled with the fact that many aliens are
enforcement agencies, prosecutors’ offices, local judges, family protective services, and
department of labors. Id. at 2–3.
322. See Benish Anver et al., U-visa: “Helpfulness”, NIWAP (July 23, 2015),
http://library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/IMM-Checklist-UVisaHelpfulness09.25.13.pdf (detailing what each certificating body may deem as “helpful”); see also Kristina
Gasson, What’s Needed for A U Visa Certification of Helpfulness, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/whats-needed-u-visa-certification-helpfulness.html
(discussing what would be considered helpful, including identification of the perpetrators and
“descriptive details that help the prosecution convince a jury that the accused is guilty of a crime”).
323. DHS GUIDE, supra note 41, at 2.
324. Conservative pundits and the current administration are likely to say that DHS and other
certifying bodies have underperformed under the past administration on immigration, and that is
why there is fraud. Supra note 313. However, in 2014, USCIS spent over $52 million on fraud
prevention, and during the fiscal year, conducted roughly 30,000 fraud investigations. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2016 at 85, 98 (2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf.
325. See generally DHS GUIDE, supra note 41, at 2–4.
326. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012).
327. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I). Because USCIS determines which applications to accept,
it determines whether the abuse was “substantial.”
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non-English speakers and may have difficulty explaining their situation
in a satisfactory manner.328 Additionally, the helpfulness requirement
does not require that the perpetrator be prosecuted, and this helps ensure
that the victim is coming forward for the proper, nonfraudulent
reasons.329 If the statute required that the perpetrator be prosecuted in
order for the victim to obtain a U-visa, that certainly would lead to
fraudulent claims; the victim would then have an overwhelming incentive
to exaggerate the abuse in order to secure a prosecution.330 Logically,
victims would be more likely to embellish in order to make sure that the
perpetrator was prosecuted, rather than tell the truth and endure the
possibility that the perpetrator not be prosecuted.
On top of the statutory requirements for U-visas, the certification
process is also a fraud prevention measure.331 After going to the police
or other law enforcement agency and reporting the crime, the victim then
has to seek certification from a certifying agent.332 It is important to
remember that this is entirely discretionary, and a law enforcement
agency is under no statutory legal obligation to complete a Supplement
Form B.333 Agencies like the EEOC that require that certifying law
enforcement officers meet directly with victims before certifying the
petition impose another level of fraud prevention.334
Beyond the statutory requirements and the certification process,
USCIS, the enforcement arm of the DHS for visas like the U-visa, has

328. See DHS GUIDE, supra note 41.
329. Sejal Zota, Law Enforcement’s Role in U Visa Certification, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T IMMIGR.
L. BULL., June 2009, at 4 (“Prosecution of the criminal activity is not required, since the statute
requires a noncitizen victim to be helpful in either the investigation or the prosecution of the
criminal activity.” (emphasis added)).
330. Id.
331. Some scholars see the certification process as a fraud prevention method, while others see
it as a roadblock. See Mankin, supra note 52, at 50. (arguing that “although it was not explicitly
created as a fraud prevention safeguard, the certification serves to discourage fraudulent claims by
imposing an additional burden of production on the applicant”). In comparison, see Amanda M.
Kjar, Comment, U-Visa Certification Requirement Is Blocking Congressional Intent Creating the
Need for A Writ of Mandate and Training—Undocumented Immigrant Female Farmworkers
Remain Hiding in the Fields of Sexual Violence, 22 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 141, 153 (2012)
(stating, “the certifying agencies are acting like a roadblock, which is resulting in injustice and the
total undermining of the congressional intent behind the U-visa”).
332. DHS GUIDE, supra note 41.
333. Id. at 5.
334. EEOC Procedures, supra note 57; see also EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO, NAT’L EMPLOYMENT
LAW PROJECT, U VISAS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME IN THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICE MANUAL
(2014), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/U-Visas-for-Victims-of-Workplace-CrimePractice-Manual-NELP.pdf (detailing more specifics about what different certifying bodies will
require). This sort of fraud prevention is not required for other visas, such as the T-visa. See supra
note 36.
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sole responsibility for making approval decisions for U-visa
applications.335 So even after the victim has gone through the
certification process, where their story is checked thoroughly, that story
is checked and investigated again. The certification process by a
certifying body has been discussed above, but the USCIS process takes
the entire process one step further. According to the DHS’s own U-visa
certification procedure, USCIS conducts a full review of the petition and
a background check of the victim including an FBI fingerprint check, a
background search through name and birthday, and a review of criminal
history.336 This examination of procedural hurdles U-visa applicants
must overcome is not to say that fraud in the U-visa program is
nonexistent,337 but USCIS may also request additional information from
both the victim requesting the U-visa and the certifying agency if
necessary to determine the merits of the application.338 These cases of
fraud are the outliers and should not be the controlling rhetoric
surrounding the U-visa program.
Additionally, the administration may want to control its negative
commentary of U-visas for fear of contradiction. President Trump has
made it a well-known priority to deport criminal aliens.339 Broadly, this
is an area where advocates of U-visas and the administration may find a
resolution. As one political commentator posed: “Trump has said that he
wants to deport immigrant criminals. What better way is there to catch
immigrant criminals than to encourage immigrants in the community to
come forward and report when a crime is committed to law
enforcement?”340
The Cazorla decision will ultimately harm the U-visa program as it
accepts the idea that fraud is a legitimate and legally cognizable defense
335. DHS GUIDE, supra note 41, at 8.
336. Id. at 5.
337. See, e.g., Indianapolis Immigration Attorney Pleads Guilty to Fraud Scheme and Identity
Theft in Relation to U-visa Applications, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Nov. 30,
2017), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/indianapolis-immigration-attorney-pleads-guilty-fraudscheme-and-identity-theft (detailing an incident where an immigration attorney fraudulently filed
more than 250 false U-visa applications).
338. DHS GUIDE, supra note 41, at 9.
339. Erik Ortiz, ‘Sanctuary’ Cities Targeted by ICE in Immigration Raids as Nearly 500
Arrested, NBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:58 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/
immigration-border-crisis/sanctuary-cities-targeted-ice-immigration-raids-nearly-500-arrestedn805796; Dara Lind, Trump on Deported Immigrants: “They’re Not People. They’re Animals.”,
VOX (May 17, 2018, 1:59 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/5/16/17362870/trump-immigrantsanimals-ms-13-illegal.
340. Sara Ramey, Opinion, Eliminating the U Visa Cap Will Help Catch Criminals, THE HILL
(Feb. 2, 2018, 11:45 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/373808-eliminating-the-u-visacap-will-help-catch-criminals.
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to a U-visa application. This is particularly dangerous in situations that
were presented in Cazorla, where a certifying body like the EEOC has
already deemed that the abuse was legitimate enough to certify the U-visa
petitions for the individual plaintiffs. 341 The Fifth Circuit tried to couch
the ultimate decision, that Koch would be able to get some information
from the individual plaintiffs in regard to their U-visas, by chastising the
district court for not looking at the implications outside of the case.342
But short of a total bar from discovery of this information, Koch and other
defendants may be able to access this information regardless of
effectively cutting right through the legislative intent of the U-visa
program in a time when immigrant crime reporting is down and thus
harmful to society as a whole.
CONCLUSION
By failing to designate an absolute bar on the discoverability of U-visa
information, the Fifth Circuit created a statutory loophole—one that tells
defendants both similar and dissimilar to Koch “if you cannot get the
information from the government agency, just ask the individual
plaintiffs.” Of course, there would still be a Rule 26 balancing test, but
just as easily, the court could have, and should have, deemed that under
Rule 26(c)(1) the undue burden was too great given the important public
policy reasons behind the confidentiality of the U-visa program. The
Cazorla opinion tries, yet fails, to fully understand and appreciate the
policy implications. There is much more data supporting the contention
that aliens who are the victims of crimes are afraid to come forward to
law enforcement than there is confirming that the U-visa program is
extremely fraudulent.
If the Fifth Circuit can recognize the importance of the protection of
information from the EEOC, failing to apply the same protection for the
same information for individual plaintiffs smacks of judicial absurdity.
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit should have ruled there is an absolute bar to
this information because the future of the U-visa program is at stake: A
program that makes everyone in the country safer, not just victims
seeking protection.

341. Supra notes 118–119. It is unclear just how many petitions the EEOC certified, as Koch
was barred from discovering that information from the EEOC. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss.,
L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 552 (5th Cir. 2016). However, the Fifth Circuit clearly held that Koch could
demand discovery of this nature from the individual plaintiffs. Id.
342. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 564.

